Tag: MDDI

Mobile Dead Zones on the MRT

In Parliament on 6 Mar 2026 I asked the Minister for Digital Development and Information whether a public dashboard could be created to track mobile network dead zones across our MRT network. It is frustrating when your data cuts out mid journey so I wanted to know if we can hold operators more accountable by making the list of these persistent signal gaps public.

Do you hit specific dead zones during your MRT trips and where? Let me know in the comments.

This is the full text of the exchange:

Mr Gerald Giam Yean Song asked the Minister for Digital Development and Information (a) whether the Infocomm Media Development Authority (IMDA) compiles a list of specific mobile network dead zones across the entire MRT network; (b) if so, whether this list and the rectification status of each site will be made public via a dashboard to ensure operator accountability; and (c) how many persistent signal gaps have remained unrectified for more than 12 months.

The Senior Minister of State for Digital Development and Information (Mr Tan Kiat How) (for the Minister for Digital Development and Information): Mobile Network Operators (MNOs) are required to meet the Infocomm Media Development Authority’s (IMDA’s) 4G Quality of Service standards, and IMDA conducts regular checks to ensure these are met. This includes the requirement to provide more than 99% mobile coverage in all Mass Rapid Transit (MRT) tunnels and MRT stations in Singapore. The Quality of Service performance results for each MRT line are published on IMDA’s website.

Where there are coverage gaps found along the MRT network, IMDA works closely with MNOs to carry out enhancements that address the gaps. MNOs typically take six months to complete these enhancements, working within the limited hours of maintenance windows for tunnel access.

Mr Speaker: Mr Giam.

Mr Gerald Giam Yean Song (Aljunied): I thank the Senior Minister of State for the reply. For the persistent dead zones that have remained unrectified after six months, does the Ministry impose any escalating financial penalties on the providers in order to ensure that there is a stronger commercial incentive for them to resolve the issues more speedily? And second, does IMDA track whether certain mobile operators have a higher proportion of these long-term dead zones and will this track record of non-compliance be factored into the pricing or allocation of future spectrum allocations or spectrum options?

Mr Tan Kiat How: Sir, as I said earlier in my reply, MNOs typically take six months to enhance coverage. Over the last three years, no persistent signal gaps within the MRT network remained unrectified.

Source: Singapore Parliament Reports (Hansard)

https://sprs.parl.gov.sg/search/#/sprs3topic?reportid=oral-answer-4084

MDDI: Cyber Defence

2 Mar 2026

Committee of Supply Debate 2026, Ministry of Digital Development and Information

On 9 February 2026, the government revealed that Singapore’s major telecommunications operators were targeted last year in a sophisticated cyber espionage campaign by the group UNC3886.

Such intrusions are a stark reminder that the digital battle space has expanded into a theatre of strategic sabotage. Advanced persistent threat actors pre-position malicious code to sit dormant for years, designed to be activated during a crisis to trigger power failures or disrupt transport and payment systems. For Singapore, this poses a direct threat to our national survival, as a coordinated disruption to civilian telecommunications, payment systems, and transport networks would directly cripple the SAF’s ability to mobilise and deploy troops at speed.

While the containment of UNC3886 demonstrates our technical proficiency, we must leverage this capacity to signal clear consequences. The government must work with international partners to communicate strategic red lines, explicitly stating that the pre-positioning of malicious code in our critical infrastructure is an unacceptable provocation.

We must leverage our attribution capabilities to call out such actors directly, while carefully weighing the diplomatic sensitivities of naming state-linked groups. We should move toward a posture of active deterrence through precise signalling and the threat of calibrated counter-measures. By doing so while remaining consistent with international law, we can avoid unintended escalation. Ultimately, we must effectively change the cost-benefit calculus of any potential aggressor.