Scams (Countermeasures) and Other Matters Bill
Gerald Giam (Aljunied)
8 Sep 2026
Mr Speaker,
Scams continue to inflict immense financial and emotional distress on Singaporeans, and I welcome the government taking action to strengthen our legislative toolkit. I am heartened to see that the Scams (Countermeasures) and Other Matters Bill reflects key principles I advocated for during the Second Reading of the Protection from Scams Bill in January 2025.
To begin with, I previously highlighted the need for a centralised mechanism to share threat intelligence and disrupt scam vectors across sectors. The Bill moves in this direction by establishing statutory powers for Disclosure Orders, enabling crucial information sharing across banks, telcos and digital platforms to facilitate cross-sector fraud prevention.
I had urged the government to prioritise real-time intervention before stolen funds vanish. The Bill tackles these high-speed scenarios by empowering specified officers to issue swift Account Disabling Orders and Service Limitation Orders to freeze suspect bank accounts, crypto wallets and communication channels. We have already seen the value of proactive, real-time action in the recent joint police operation with crypto exchanges, which successfully foiled almost S$9 million in scam losses through rapid detection and data sharing.
I stressed the importance of greater accountability from digital platforms and service providers. The Bill strengthens deterrence by increasing maximum administrative financial penalties for non-compliant online providers to S$10 million, alongside targeted measures to crack down on money mules who surrender their credentials.
However, there are several critical areas that require further strengthening to build a more comprehensive framework.
First, the government should establish a clear statutory victim compensation framework that holds financial institutions, telcos and digital platforms accountable when their anti-scam measures fail to protect customers.
Second, a dedicated, independent investigative body should be set up to handle claims under the Shared Responsibility Framework (SRF). Under current SRF guidelines, the financial institution acts as the overall point of contact and conducts the initial assessment to determine whether it met its duties. While these are internal investigation teams independent of business units, this remains an internal process operated by the bank itself, presenting an inherent conflict of interest as the bank acts as both the investigator and an interested party with a financial incentive to deny liability.
Furthermore, while dissatisfied customers can escalate disputes to the Financial Industry Disputes Resolution Centre (FIDReC), FIDReC is a dispute resolution and mediation body rather than a dedicated investigative agency with direct statutory powers to extract system logs, fraud detection records or independently audit technical records.
Third, MAS and IMDA should introduce a standardised public rating system to regularly assess and publish the anti-scam performance of financial institutions, telcos and online platforms. These public ratings need not disclose specific technical vulnerabilities. Rather, clear and standardised ratings would serve as a powerful incentive for entities to continuously improve their anti-scam measures. Public transparency enables consumers to make informed choices and vote with their wallets, creating healthy market forces that drive a race to the top.
Fourth, regulators should build upon the account-disabling powers in this Bill by mandating real-time fraud monitoring for digital wallet transactions after setup, as well as expanding algorithmic anomaly detection across retail stock brokerages and flagged messaging channels. Scammers routinely exploit social engineering to trick victims into approving initial digital wallet setups on services like Apple Pay or Google Pay, after which subsequent draining transactions can proceed without triggering multi-factor authentication.
Similarly, in stock ramp-and-dump schemes, scammers lure victims through chat groups to buy foreign micro-cap stocks on licensed exchanges. Requiring real-time pattern monitoring—such as flagging sudden coordinated retail buy orders or reported scam invitation links—will better ensure proactive intervention before funds are lost.
Fifth, a dedicated Scam Victim Restitution Fund should be established. As I raised in a Parliamentary Question on 28 February 2025, such a fund could be financed by confiscated assets so that local scam victims can receive a portion of recovered proceeds. While I acknowledge the operational complexities raised, establishing a structured fund would demonstrate tangible solidarity with victims who currently face low fund recovery rates. During that exchange, then-Minister of State Sun Xueling mentioned that various proposals were being considered to see how best to return recovered scam proceeds to victims. Could the Minister update this House on what proposals are currently being considered or implemented?
Mr Speaker, while this Bill provides vital emergency brakes, we can build greater resilience against scams by incorporating these structural safeguards. I urge the government to address these proposals in future legislation and regulations to ensure better protection and recourse for Singaporeans who are victims of scams.
Notwithstanding these concerns, I support the Bill.