Energy resilience and Singapore’s energy transition

The recent natural gas supply disruptions and consequential increase in electricity prices have brought to the fore the importance of strengthening our nation’s energy resilience. 

To-date, five electricity retailers will be dimming their lights and others have stopped accepting new customers. This has impacted over 150,000 customers, who will most likely have to pay more for electricity in the coming months.

This may be just the tip of the iceberg of people affected by increasing electricity prices. About 714,000 households which had not previously switched to a retailer in the Open Electricity Market are paying a regulated electricity tariff which has increased by 32% since last September. According to the answer to a Parliamentary Question I asked in January, 79% of HDB 1-2 room households and 63% of 3-roomers are paying the regulated tariff, compared to just 40% of those living in landed properties. This indicates that lower income Singaporeans may be disproportionately impacted by higher electricity prices. 

Other households which have locked in lower rates in their retail contracts will soon face their day of reckoning when they renew their contracts, as the new rates will reflect the higher prevailing electricity prices.

This electricity price hike couldn’t have come at a worse time for many households. Our economy has yet to fully recover from the pandemic-induced downturn, and many Singaporeans are still struggling with job losses, salary reductions and disrupted careers. Many are working and studying from home, resulting in higher household electricity usage.

I would like to reiterate the request I made yesterday for lower income households to be given a one-off special additional electricity rebate during this difficult period. This should be on top of existing U-save rebates, which were calculated before the current electricity price increases occurred. I appreciate Minister Tan See Leng’s reply yesterday that he is exploring with MOF further means to help and is working out the details with them.

The current electricity price increase can be traced to disruptions in the supply of natural gas to Singapore and higher demand globally. In the last few months, the curtailment of the flow of gas from Indonesia’s West Natuna gas field and the low landing pressure of the gas supplied from South Sumatra has severely impacted a vital source of our power generation needs. 

Questions on the Bill

The Energy (Resilience Measures and Miscellaneous Amendments) Bill that is before the House today is timely as it seeks to better safeguard Singapore’s energy security. It enables the Energy Market Authority (EMA) to construct, acquire, manage and protect electricity infrastructure and authorises EMA to implement policies to reduce the emission of greenhouse gases in the generation of electricity.

It is comforting to know that EMA will be able to step in to build, own and operate power generation plants if needed. However in practice, this will be done only as a last resort, for example, if existing gencos fail in their roles? Or is EMA already making plans to directly build and operate critical electricity infrastructure like undersea cables to import electricity from overseas? 

I note the Minister just said in his Second Reading speech that the Government’s preference is for the private sector to build, own and operate electricity infrastructure, and that before exercising this power, EMA will explore the options available. 

The Minister also just assured the House that EMA will put in place governance structures to mitigate conflicts of interest. Can he elaborate on what these governance structures will be to ensure fair competition in the electricity market and mitigate conflicts of interest?

The Government has announced plans to embark on a multi-decade programme to transition our electricity generation to low-carbon generation sources through four supply “switches”. 

These are, first, by increasing the energy efficiency of natural gas power plants. Second, by accelerating solar deployment. Third, by tapping on regional power grids for low-carbon electricity imports. And fourth, by developing low-carbon solutions such as hydrogen and carbon capture, utilisation and storage (also known as CCUS).

Heavy reliance on natural gas

About 95% of our electricity is generated from imported natural gas. This is unusually high compared to other countries and it carries concentration risks.

Recently, the tiny European nation of Moldova, which gets almost all its gas from Russia, had to declare a state of emergency over a gas shortage. The Russian state gas giant, Gazprom, hiked its prices four-fold, then reduced supply when Moldova refused to pay. Moscow has been accused of “weaponizing” its gas monopoly in Moldova, which recently elected a pro-Western president and parliament.

In Singapore, around 70% of our natural gas is piped from Malaysia and Indonesia. Will we face similar threats should relations with our neighbours get rocky, as they do from time-to-time?

In fact, it may already be happening even in the absence of diplomatic problems. In February 2020, the Indonesian government announced that it intends to halt gas exports to Singapore by 2023, when one of our two gas pipeline contracts expires. This ought to set off alarm bells, given our heavy reliance on Indonesian piped natural gas.

Over the years, Singapore has worked hard to diversify our national water taps away from an overreliance on imported water from Malaysia, to ensure a more robust and sustainable water supply. We need to do the same for our energy supply switches.

How will the Government diversify our current 95% dependence on imported national gas for power generation?

Clearly, we cannot afford to shift back to dirty fuels like oil and coal, which in any case also need to be imported. Therefore our future lies in a greater reliance on renewable energy.

Political risk of energy imports

The third supply switch envisions tapping on regional power grids for clean energy imports. Singapore is planning to import up to four gigawatts of low-carbon electricity by 2035, which is expected to make up around 30% of Singapore’s electricity supply.

However, the proposed import of electricity generated from solar farms in Australia’s Northern Territory will be via undersea cables running through Indonesian waters. This could present the same political risks as transnational gas pipelines. The Indonesian government had to approve the undersea cable route last September, and it is unclear how long this approval will be for.

On 22 October, Malaysia announced that it will not allow renewable energy exports to Singapore. Their former prime minister Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamed questioned why non-renewable energy exports to Singapore were allowed. 

Australian support for the export of renewable energy to Singapore may also wane with political winds. Some NUS researchers recently warned that the Australian government may suffer some push back from its powerful coal lobby.

On the flip side, even countries which support the development of renewables might prefer to use their clean energy domestically to meet their own net-zero pledges.

With Singapore potentially sandwiched between competing interests that we have no control over, how will the Government manage the political risks associated with importing 30% of our electricity in the future?

More ambitious renewable energy goals

With both natural gas and electricity imports carrying risks, we need to strengthen our indigenous capabilities to produce clean energy.

Our geography and highly urban landscape limits our renewable energy options. We don’t have wide open deserts to set up large solar farms, but we have plenty of building rooftops and intense tropical sunlight. 

Solar power, however, tends to be intermittent. When the sun stops shining, the electrons also stop flowing. Fortunately battery technology has improved tremendously in recent years, driven by the growth in electric cars. At the same time, the price of lithium-ion batteries is expected to fall 45% between 2018 and 2030. Better energy storage systems will smooth out of the imbalances between supply and demand of solar power.

EMA has said that it is targeting a 2 gigawatt-peak of solar energy by 2030. Yet even if this target is met, solar will supply only around 3% of our total electricity demand. 

Is this really the best we can achieve with solar? Are we planning for a large-scale deployment of solar panels on building rooftops, reservoirs and even offshore islands? Are we providing companies sufficient incentives to boost adoption of energy storage systems that are paired with solar installations?

Besides solar energy, have we done a deep dive to explore other renewables like tidal energy, geothermal energy and offshore wind farms? 

We don’t have very much time to diversify our energy sources away from natural gas. As countries shut down their pollutive coal-fired power plants, natural gas will increasingly be used as a transition fuel. This will reduce the supply available to us and raise its price. 

The Government, industry and our people need to double down to innovate and come up with more clean energy solutions to diversify our energy mix, strengthen our energy resilience and meet our climate change pledges.

Singapore’s energy transition must be accelerated and managed well, to ensure that our lights stay on and our electricity bills remain affordable.

Sir, I support the Bill.


The above was a speech I delivered on 2 Nov 2021 in Parliament during the debate on the Energy (Resilience Measures and Miscellaneous Amendments) Bill.

Free ART kits for regular testing

New Covid-19 health protocols were announced on 8 Oct 2021, emphasising personal responsibility, self-management and a greater reliance on antigen rapid tests (ART). Singapore residents are now encouraged to test themselves regularly, especially before visiting elderly relatives or other Covid-vulnerable persons.

While it is laudable that the Government has distributed (or is distributing) 16 ART kits to each household between August and December, this may not be sufficient under the new protocols. A family of four testing themselves once a week will use up their free kits in just a month. The kits are available in pharmacies, but $36 per family per test is non-trivial. With such rationing and costs, most households will use their ART kits sparingly and only when required to by law. On a national scale, this will not help in arresting the spread of Covid-19 and protect our elderly and our healthcare system.

Of course, not everyone will be visiting grandma every week, so it would be wasteful to give free kits to every household. Instead, these kits could be available upon request to those who need it for their personal use. We already have a distribution channel for this — vending machines.

Here is the text of my question:

Mr Gerald Giam Yean Song: Asked the Minister for Health in view of the updated health protocols announced on 8 October 2021 emphasising personal responsibility, self-management and a greater reliance on antigen rapid tests (ART), whether the Government will allow individuals to collect free ART kits for their own regular testing, from designated vending machines, to supplement the free kits that will be distributed to all households from October to December 2021.

This was the Minister’s answer on 2 Nov 2021:

Mr Ong Ye Kung: Each individual who receive a Health Risk Warning (HRW) can
collect six Antigen Rapid Test (ART) kits from vending machines located islandwide. Workers on mandatory regular testing regimes are currently also provided with free kits by the Government. To support individuals to self-test regularly, we had distributed six kits to each household from August to September, and are distributing another ten kits from October to December. Individuals who need more kits can purchase them from major retailers and e-commerce platforms.

Vaccinations for inbound travellers and exceptions

I have filed a Parliamentary question for the Minister for Transport for the next sitting of Parliament, to ask whether all visitors, including those from countries with Air Travel Pass arrangements, are required to be fully vaccinated prior to arrival in Singapore. I have also asked what exceptions are being granted to this rule.

This is the full text of my question:

Mr Gerald Giam Yean Song: To ask the Minister for Transport (a) whether all visitors, including those from countries with Air Travel Pass arrangements, are required to be fully vaccinated prior to arrival in Singapore; (b) which groups of visitors are excluded from this requirement; and (c) what are the reasons for these exclusions, if any.

Update (14 Nov 2021):

This is the full text of the Minister’s answer on 1 Nov 2021, which was answered together with several other questions:

VACCINATED TRAVEL LANE ARRANGEMENTS WITH MORE TERRITORIES

The following question stood in the name of Mr Ang Wei Neng –

42 To ask the Minister for Transport whether Singapore is considering accelerating Vaccinated Travel Lane (VTL) arrangements with more territories, especially those with lower COVID-19 infection rates such as Australia, China, Hong Kong and New Zealand.

43 Mr Kwek Hian Chuan Henry asked the Minister for Transport whether the Ministry will consider increasing the quota for passengers from Vaccinated Travel Lane (VTL) flights given that VTL flights are from countries with similar risks and that the adult passengers are already vaccinated and tested multiple times prior to entry.

The Minister for Transport (Mr S Iswaran): Mr Speaker, Sir, may I have your indulgence. My reply would take a little bit longer than the allotted time.

Mr Speaker: Yes, carry on.

Mr S Iswaran: Mr Speaker, may I have your permission to take Question Nos 42 and 43 on the vaccinated travel lane, together?

Mr Speaker: Yes, please.

Mr S Iswaran: I also would like to address similar questions on this subject that have been filed by Mr Saktiandi Supaat1, Mr Louis Chua2, Mr Gerald Giam3, Mr Shawn Huang4 and Mr Dennis5 Tan for subsequent Sittings.

I want to start by taking stock of where we are in terms of border reopening. 

Members would be aware that MOH has established a risk-based categorisation of countries and regions. This framework is based on its public health assessment of a country or region’s COVID-19 situation, including its infection rate and vaccination coverage.  

Countries and regions in Category I are of the lowest risk. Currently, this includes Mainland China, Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan. These are countries and regions which continue to adopt a “zero-COVID” approach, and which therefore continue to have very low COVID-19 incidence rates. To Mr Ang Wei Neng’s question, we have already opened our borders to all travellers from these countries unilaterally. They can enter Singapore quarantine-free and need only undergo an on-arrival PCR test. To Mr Gerald Giam’s question, we do not require the visitors who arrive from these Category I countries and regions to be vaccinated.

Countries and regions in Category II are of a similar incidence rate to Singapore or lower. Since 8 September 2020, we have reopened to vaccinated travellers from some of these countries in a cautious and calibrated manner through the Vaccinated Travel Lanes (VTLs). We started the VTL scheme with two countries, namely Brunei Darussalam and Germany, and have since extended it to eight others. We have also announced the commencement of VTLs with Australia and Switzerland from 8 November, and with the Republic of Korea from 15 November. In total, we have launched VTLs with 13 countries, which is a fraction of the countries that Changi Airport was connected to pre-COVID-19. Collectively, they accounted for about 15% of Changi’s annual passenger arrivals pre-COVID-19.

Mr Henry Kwek, Mr Saktiandi and Mr Louis Chua have asked about the quota and designated flights for the VTLs, and how these are distributed.

We set an overall quota for the VTL scheme as a safeguard to manage the public health risk. The quota is allocated to airlines operating flights to and from VTL countries based on the plans they submit. The allocation for each country and airline can vary based on demand, but the total will be kept within the overall quota. The airlines can only carry eligible passengers on the designated VTL flights. The Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore (CAAS) monitors the airlines closely to ensure their adherence to the stipulated measures and allocated quota. 

The quota for the first 10 VTL countries is 2,500. When the VTLs with Australia, Switzerland and the Republic of Korea commence later this month, the total daily quota for all 13 countries on the VTL scheme will be increased to 4,000. This is about 5% of the total daily arrivals at Changi pre-COVID-19. There will be about 19 daily VTL flights from these 13 countries, with an average VTL quota of 200 per flight.

 We will monitor the incidence rate and the proportion of imported cases closely, review the demand, before deciding on any further increases in the quotas.

 Mr Ang Wei Neng, Mr Shawn Hwang and Mr Dennis Tan have asked about our plans to extend the VTLs to more countries and our criteria for doing so.

 We are in discussions with several partners, including our regional neighbours, to reopen safely to each other. We hope to conclude these discussions soon and restore our connectivity with them. We will announce details when ready.

 I would like to emphasise that in these early stages of reopening our borders, it is more important that we do it well rather than scale up fast.

We have therefore expanded the VTL scheme step-by-step, informed by the public health assessment of the country’s or region’s COVID-19 situation, and also the operational risks and implications. This includes whether key safeguards under the VTL scheme can be effectively implemented, such as whether travellers from the VTL countries can present digitally verifiable and authenticated proof of vaccination as a precondition for entry. We work closely with MOH to regularly review safeguards such as the testing protocols based on the latest scientific evidence and testing technology. Even as we seek to reopen our border and restore connectivity with the rest of the world, safeguarding public health is our utmost priority.  

Mr Saktiandi has asked whether the VTL approach is transitory and what my Ministry’s plans are for reopening our borders thereafter. Sir, the VTL scheme is a pathfinder to restoring general air travel, enabling us to establish the protocols for safe reopening to vaccinated travellers. We will progressively expand the scheme as we gain experience and confidence in reopening our borders safely.

Ultimately, our goal is to restore safe two-way quarantine-free travel with countries and regions from around the world. As part of “Living with COVID-19”, we must be resolute and press on with the reopening of our borders, while staying vigilant with the essential public health safeguards. It is crucial to rebuilding and reclaiming our status as an international aviation hub. Much obliged, Speaker.


Note(s) to Question No(s) 42-43:

1 To ask the Minister for Transport (a) what factors will be considered in future adjustments to the quota of Vaccinated Travel Lane (VTL) travellers entering Singapore; and (b) if the VTL approach is transitory, what are the Ministry’s plans to eventually reopen without any country differentiation and with measures for vaccinated residents to travel overseas and return with or without quarantine.  

2 To ask the Minister for Transport for the 11 countries currently under the Vaccinated Travel Lane (VTL) (a) what is the total number of designated VTL flights per month and the average daily seat capacity on such flights based on current flight schedules registered with the CAAS; (b) what is total number of flights per month and the average daily seat capacity on all flights from these countries regardless of VTL designation; and (c) what are the factors and thresholds that the Ministry will consider before raising the designated VTL capacity.  

3 To ask the Minister for Transport (a) whether all visitors, including those from countries with Air Travel Pass arrangements, are required to be fully vaccinated prior to arrival in Singapore; (b) which groups of visitors are excluded from this requirement; and (c) what are the reasons for these exclusions, if any.  

4 To ask the Minister for Transport (a) what are the Vaccinated Travel Lane (VTL) assessment criteria; and (b) which other countries are expected to be included in the VTL list.  

5 To ask the Minister for Transport (a) whether the Government is working on establishing Vaccinated Travel Lanes for all ASEAN member countries; (b) if so, whether an update can be provided; and (c) what are the conditions which will be conducive to allow such access.  

Source: https://sprs.parl.gov.sg/search/sprs3topic?reportid=oral-answer-2641

Electricity price increases and energy resilience

Recently four electricity retailers announced they will be exiting the open electricity market while two others have stopped accepting new customers. This will impact over 150,000 households and businesses, who will most likely have to pay more for electricity in the coming months. The price increases can be traced to disruptions in the supply of natural gas to Singapore. About 95% of our electricity is generated from imported natural gas, of which around 70% is piped from Malaysia and Indonesia. 

I have filed two sets of Parliamentary questions for the Minister for Trade and Industry. 

First, I asked how many households are expected to have their contracts transferred back to SP Group in the next few months and what is the expected increase in electricity price they will face. How will the Government be assisting households who are negatively impacted? 

Second, I have asked why piped natural gas from Indonesia was curtailed recently and what other such disruptions have occurred in the last six months. How long will our reserves of liquified natural gas last under current conditions? I have asked for an update on how the Government is exploring alternatives to natural gas for power generation.

This is the full text of my questions to be answered on 1 Nov 2021:

Mr Gerald Giam Yean Song: To ask the Minister for Trade and Industry regarding the recent exit of several electricity retailers from the open electricity market (a) how many households are expected to have their contracts transferred back to SP Group in the next few months; (b) what is the expected increase in electricity prices they will face with this change; and (c) how is the Ministry assisting households negatively affected by these changes.

Mr Gerald Giam Yean Song: To ask the Minister for Trade and Industry (a) what are the reasons for the recent curtailment of piped natural gas (PNG) from West Natuna; (b) what other disruptions to PNG supplies have been experienced in the past six months; (c) whether Singapore has had to use its reserves of liquified natural gas; (d) how long will these reserves last under current conditions; and (e) how is the Ministry exploring alternatives to natural gas for power generation.

Migrant worker welfare in dormitories

The crisis at the Westlite Jalan Tukang migrant worker dormitory burst into public consciousness on 13 Oct 2021, when a group of workers collectively raised their grievances with the dorm management and posted photos and videos on social media. This resulted in armoured riot police being called in, although there were no news reports of violence. 

The workers’ grievances included catered meals served to them that allegedly contained insects, worms, hair and bits of newspaper (which their employer claims it has not found evidence of), and delays in isolating Covid-19 infected workers and transporting them to medical facilities. The incident also revealed that a relatively large proportion of the workers in this dorm were unvaccinated or had yet to have their vaccination status verified. It was reported that a quarter of the 2,000 workers got infected, despite the supposedly improved standards to strengthen public health resilience in migrant worker dorms.

The dorm is managed by Centurion Corp and houses mostly workers from Sembcorp Marine. Catering Solutions is being investigated by the Singapore Food Agency over meals it provided to workers in this dorm.

I have filed some questions in Parliament for the Minister for Manpower to answer on 1 Nov. I have asked what the reasons were for the delays in isolation and treatment of COVID-19 infected workers, the extensive cross infection of workers, the serving of food unfit for consumption and the relatively low vaccination rate of workers at the Westlite Jalan Tukang dormitory. I also asked what enforcement action will be taken against the operators, employers or food caterers, if they contravened any regulations.

It is possible that these unacceptable conditions are not isolated to the Tukang dorm. I therefore asked if MOM has received similar complaints from workers in other dormitories, and if it has acted on them.

This is the full text of my Parliamentary question:

Mr Gerald Giam Yean Song: To ask the Minister for Manpower (a) what are the reasons for the delays in isolation and treatment of COVID-19 infected workers, the extensive cross infection of workers, the serving of food unfit for consumption and the relatively low vaccination rate of workers at the Westlite Jalan Tukang dormitory; (b) what enforcement action will be taken against the operators, employers or food caterers; and (c) whether the Ministry has received and acted upon similar complaints from workers in other dormitories.


My Workers’ Party parliamentary colleagues, Leader of the Opposition Pritam Singh (Aljunied), Leon Perera (Aljunied), Faisal Manap (Aljunied), He Ting Ru (Sengkang) and Dennis Tan (Hougang) have also filed PQs on this matter.

Reducing second-hand smoke flowing into flats

Frequently breathing in second-hand smoke from a neighbour’s flat is an extremely vexing issue for many of my constituents. Each time I do house-to-house visits, I will almost always meet residents who express their frustration with a neighbour’s smoking patterns.

I too have faced this issue with my neighbours in the past. “The guy downstairs is smoking again! Quick close the windows!” went the nightly ritual. Thankfully (for me) those neighbours have since moved out. However, the problem persists for thousands of other families, including those with young children or elderly parents.

Previous appeals for the Government to prohibit smoking near windows have been met with resistance for reasons including avoiding government overreach into private spaces and difficulty in enforcement. Perhaps we need to take another approach.

I am glad that the Municipal Services Office has put out a call for proposals to find technological solutions to ameliorate this problem. I hope scientists and entrepreneurs will step forward to submit innovative and effective proposals before the 9 Dec 2021 deadline, for the benefit of thousands of longsuffering residents.

I asked a question about this in Parliament on 5 Oct 2021. This was the full Parliamentary question and answer:

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FROM HDB TO REDUCE DIFFUSION OF  SECOND-HAND SMOKE INTO FLATS 

Mr Gerald Giam Yean Song asked the Minister for National Development what  forms of technical assistance does HDB provide to flat occupants to reduce the diffusion  of second-hand smoke at its source or prevent smoke from entering their flats.  

Mr Desmond Lee: When secondhand tobacco smoke drifts from one HDB unit to  another, it could cause discomfort and nuisance to neighbours. When approached by  residents affected by secondhand tobacco smoke from neighbouring homes, HDB,  together with Town Councils and the National Environment Agency, would first  encourage neighbours to speak to each other to try to resolve the matter. Where  necessary, a Joint Advisory on Smoking in Homes will be issued to the flat reported to be  emitting second-hand smoke, encouraging considerate behaviour and emphasising the harmful impact that second-hand smoke may have on their neighbours. 

If this does not work, the agencies will advise the affected neighbour to seek  mediation, followed by a filing at the Community Dispute Resolution Tribunal.

The Member is likely to be referring to a recent joint Call for Proposals issued by the  Municipal Services Office (MSO) with the support of HDB, under the latter’s Cool Ideas  Enterprise programme. The objective is to tap on technology to find innovative ways to  tackle secondhand tobacco smoke. MSO welcomes proposals that can reduce second hand smoke at its source, or prevent it from entering neighbouring units. MSO also welcomes proposals to help residents gather evidence that they can then use in the dispute  resolution process, for example non-intrusive means of identifying the source of cigarette smoke and measuring its impact on the affected households. 

The Call for Proposals closes on 9th December, after which MSO will evaluate the  proposals with HDB’s technical input to determine which are suitable for further  development and trials. This complements ongoing efforts by an inter-agency committee led by MCCY to review the Community Dispute Management Framework. Among other  things, the committee is looking at strengthening the effectiveness of community  mediation, and to make the last resort of filing a Community Dispute Resolution Tribunal  case more accessible and expedient for claimants. 

Retired senior SAF officers in the public service

This was the full Parliamentary question and answer from 4 Oct 2021:

RETIRED SENIOR SAF OFFICERS HOLDING SENIOR POSITIONS IN  PUBLIC SECTOR ORGANISATIONS

Mr Gerald Giam Yean Song asked the Prime Minister (a) how many currently  retired SAF officers with the rank of colonel or ME7 and above have held senior  positions in public sector organisations; (b) how does PSD determine which officers have  sufficient competencies to lead these organisations despite not having had civilian work  experience; and (c) whether PSD has considered requiring these officers to spend several  years building up sectoral knowledge and skills before taking the helm of these  organisations. 

Mr Chan Chun Sing (for the Prime Minister): As at 24 September 2021, there are  15 officers formerly from the SAF who are currently holding senior leadership  appointments in the Public Service (e.g. Permanent Secretaries, Deputy Secretaries and  Chief Executives). They form around 10% of these appointments. Looking at the figures  another way, of the SAF personnel holding the rank of Colonel or ME7 and above who  retired between 2010 and now, about 7% went on to assume senior Public Service  appointments. 

In line with recruitment for other positions in the Public Service, we adopt the  principle of “best available person for the job” in recruiting for senior appointments.  Agencies typically consider candidates from within the ranks of their organisations, the  wider Public Service including the Uniformed Services, and where relevant, the private  sector. When it comes to former Uniformed Services officers, agencies would take a  considered view of the officer’s career experience and competencies/qualities, together  with other available candidates, before deciding on the best person for the senior role. 

Candidates from the SAF, or the Uniformed Services in general, including the Home  Team, would have served in roles that have developed in them a range of competencies,  such as strategic leadership, organisation transformation, policy formulation, running of large-scale operations, and technology management, that are generally relevant to senior  management positions in the Public Service. They also have valuable experience in  working with, understanding, motivating, and winning the confidence of Full-time and  Operationally Ready National Servicemen who are Singaporeans from all walks of life.  Officers who demonstrate the capacity to assume top leadership positions are tested and  prepared through challenging postings and leadership programmes. In addition, these  officers are provided opportunities to develop Whole-of-Government perspectives  through inter-agency projects, board directorships and external postings to the Public  Service during their military careers. These experiences prepare the officers to assume  senior appointments in the military, and also provide them with the background and  perspective to take on senior leadership positions in the wider Public Service, if called  upon and found suitable. 

Sector-specific knowledge and skills are part of the considerations, but not the only  consideration. Public Service leadership teams are expected to comprise leaders who  bring diverse experiences to the table and operate cohesively as a team, tapping on each  other’s skills and experiences.


This was a related question asked the same day by Ms He Ting Ru, MP for Sengkang GRC:

APPOINTMENT OF NEW CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF EARLY  CHILDHOOD DEVELOPMENT AGENCY 

Ms He Ting Ru asked the Minister for Social and Family Development in relation  to the appointment of the new Chief Executive Officer of the Early Childhood  Development Agency (ECDA) from December 2021 (a) how many candidates were  considered for the role; (b) what were the factors and qualifications considered for the  candidates; and (c) why was the final decision made to appoint a CEO with no early  childhood or educational experience. 

Mr Masagos Zulkifli B M M: In coordination with the Public Service Division, the  Ministry of Social and Family Development (MSF) had considered several qualified  candidates to be appointed as the Chief Executive Officer of the Early Childhood  Development Agency (ECDA). Mr Tan Chee Wee was assessed to be the most suitable  among the candidates. Mr Tan is not unfamiliar with the social sector as he had  previously served in the then-Ministry of Community Development, Youth and Sports  from 2006 to 2008, where he supervised the macro-planning of government-funded social  services and development of the social service sector, building up capabilities and human  resources. 

 

Speech on the Foreign Interference (Countermeasures) Bill

FICA enacts many broad and sweeping measures in an attempt to prevent Singaporeans from being misled by hostile information campaigns over the internet. If these draconian measures are not properly limited, they could have a chilling effect on freedom of speech and the exchange of information among Singaporeans.

4 Oct 2021, Parliament

Mr Speaker,

Since the FICA Bill was tabled just three weeks ago, we have seen a flurry of criticism by lawyers, NGOs, academics and journalists, with some wondering if it will affect perceptions of Singapore as a global hub. Some of my constituents have written to me expressing their concern with the Bill’s overreach.

These criticisms are not unfounded and are reflective of the disquiet felt by many. The root of this disquiet is that FICA enacts many broad and sweeping measures in an attempt to prevent Singaporeans from being misled by hostile information campaigns over the internet. If these draconian measures are not properly limited, they could have a chilling effect on freedom of speech and the exchange of information among Singaporeans.

At the same time, FICA seems to be lacking a sharper approach to deal with real threats that Singapore might face. The Bill does not provide enough countermeasures against elite capture, which is the clandestine foreign lobbying of Singaporeans holding positions of influence. Elite capture can potentially have a far more negative impact on public policies than influence campaigns on the general public.

Fundamentally, no legislation can effectively counter foreign interference in our politics by itself. Public education and a freer press are also needed to inoculate our population against these risks.

Let me now elaborate on these three points.

Protecting public debate

First, on protecting public debate. The definition of “public interest” in Clause 7 includes the prevention of “any foreign interference directed towards a political end in Singapore.” In turn, Clause 8 defines an activity to be “directed towards a political end in Singapore” if its purpose includes influencing public opinion on a matter of public controversy in Singapore, or if it promotes or opposes views on a subject of a political debate in Singapore.

The “public interest” is one of the bases for the Minister to authorise Part 3 directions (Cl 20(1)(d)), anticipatory directions (Cl 21(1)(c)), designations of politically significant persons (PSPs) (Cl 48(1)(b)) or entities (Cl 47(1)(b)), technical assistance directions (Cl 34(c)) or directives regarding donors (Cl 88(k)).

With the inclusion of Clause 8(f) and (g), the Bill’s interpretation of “political end” covers an extremely wide variety of policy matters and issues which may be discussed by Singaporeans. Public discussions on these issues invariably involve the views and voices of foreigners.

FICA sets a low bar on what constitutes the “public interest”. It empowers the Minister to block public discussions if it is, in his opinion, in the public interest to take action. This gives the Minister for Home Affairs very wide discretion to authorise Part 3 directions or designate PSPs.

It could stifle genuine political debate by discouraging Singapore citizens or local NGOs from speaking up, even in good faith, for fear of being issued a directive under FICA or designated as a PSP. While the Government might argue that having a directive issued against, say, a Facebook post is not a death warrant, it carries a reputational risk to the target of that directive. It would be very unfortunate if an NGO engaged in advocacy work, for example speaking up on migrant workers’ rights, is designated as a politically significant entity (PSEs). 

I note that MHA has tried to give assurances that this type of activity will not be stopped, but these assurances are not in the letter of the law. This is why the Member for Sengkang, Assoc Prof Jamus Lim, tabled amendments to Clause 120 to codify MHA’s assurances in this Bill.

I tabled amendments for subsections (f) and (g) under Clause 8 to be removed. Removing these two subsections will not hinder the Minister from applying the brakes on hostile foreign influence operations that could harm Singapore. Clause 7 already has a list of actions that are contrary to the public interest, which the Minister is empowered to authorise Part 3 directions against. These include threats to public health, finances, safety, tranquillity, peace and order, as well as incitement of feelings of enmity, hatred or ill-will between different groups of people in Singapore which may endanger the public peace and public order of Singapore.

Let me address the scenarios given by the Minister in his speech.

Setting one race against another or using religion to drive a wedge  between religious groups could be considered incitement of feelings of ill-will between different groups of people in Singapore and would already fall under Clause 7(d).

A foreign agent promoting harmful falsehoods about approved vaccines could be reined in to protect public health under Clause 7(b).

In short, our amendments to the Bill will not prevent the Minister from acting against foreigners seeking to do harm to Singapore, but they will go some way in preventing genuine political discussions from being stifled, either deliberately by the Government of the day or inadvertently due to their mere presence.

Preventing elite capture

Next, I wish to highlight an area where the Bill does not do enough of, which is preventing elite capture. 

While high profile influence campaigns tend to hog the limelight, clandestine foreign lobbying of individual elites is, by definition, done in secret. The most likely targets of these secret influence operations are our political elites. Many democracies have countermeasures in place to deal with the risk of such influence operations.

The US has the Foreign Agent Registration Act (FARA), enacted in 1938, which requires agents of foreigners to register or risk prosecution under federal law. These agents must disclose their agreements with foreign principals, report the funding they have received and provide a log of all activities performed on behalf of the foreign principals. The Singapore Government would be familiar with FARA because agencies like EDB, STB, Temasek Holdings and the Government itself have all been registered as foreign principals. These registrations are transparent to the public and can be downloaded from the FARA website.

Australia has the Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme Act which has a Registry of Interests. Taiwan has the Sunshine Acts which require public officers from the President all the way down to the Administrator for Company Registrations, and their immediate family members, to make public declarations of their assets, which helps combat both graft and foreign influence operations. In addition, most of these democracies provide for independent legislative review through regular select committee hearings. 

Policymaking in Singapore is highly concentrated in the top ranks of the Government and Civil Service. Many policymakers regularly exchange ideas with each other in informal settings like golf courses and exclusive clubs like the Pyramid Club. These are places where informal discussions on policies may take place well before they are discussed in the media or drafted into law.

Yet in the Bill, the list of defined PSPs excludes senior public officers. This could make it easier for malign foreign actors to co-opt local elites to use their influence, either wittingly or unwittingly, for the benefit of foreign powers.

This is why I tabled amendments to the Bill to add several more classes of people to the list of defined PSPs under Clauses 14 and 78. 

My proposed additions to the list include permanent secretaries and deputy secretaries in government ministries. These officials lead the formulation and drafting of legislation. They are subject matter experts who provide important policy advice to Ministers on almost a daily basis.

The Minister has argued that civil servants are subject to the Instruction Manual and various rules and declaration requirements which are cumulatively stricter than the FICA requirements on PSPs. This is even more reason to include PSs, DSs and stat board CEOs as PSPs. FICA will provide a stronger layer of public transparency, accountability and oversight, without making it any more onerous on them. Their names will be made public on the register of PSPs, and any foreigner dealing with them will know that they are PSPs, and vice versa.

The chairpersons, board members and chief executives of statutory boards also have important roles in influencing and implementing Government policies. I cannot agree with the Minister that it is impractical to define this group as PSPs, just because some of them are foreigners. Stat boards are not private firms. The fact that many of stat board members are foreigners is even more reason to impose transparency requirements so that the public and Government can be more confident that they are acting in the best interests of Singapore. 

Our list also includes the board members and chief executives of Temasek, GIC, MAS and CPF Board. These individuals provide directions on policies and long-term asset allocations that involve hundreds of billions of dollars of our national reserves. Surely we can all agree that these decisions must be guarded against any malign foreign interference.

All these influential individuals should be subject to the same level of scrutiny of their foreign connections as election agents and candidates, the latter of whom are already on the list of defined PSPs, but are far less influential in policymaking.

Lastly, central executive committee members of registered political parties are included because they have a role in setting the policy and political positions that their party takes into elections or Parliament.

While this expanded list of defined PSPs does not cover every possible person who can influence policies, it provides for additional scrutiny over interactions between government elites and foreign principals. It will require them to disclose foreign affiliations, reportable arrangements and migration benefits with foreign principals, all of which have the potential to colour their decisions on domestic and foreign policies which affect all Singaporeans.

Public conversations on core national interests

The last part of my speech will focus on the other actions that are essential to our efforts to combat foreign interference and protect our core national interests. We need to focus much more on public education and avoid over-relying on legislative measures to curb hostile foreign interference. This is a point made by the Leader of the Opposition earlier. Back in 2019, Minister Chan Chun Sing also said that a discerning electorate is the best defence against foreign influence. I couldn’t agree more.

Given the growing sophistication in the way foreign powers conduct their influence operations, which Minister Shanmugam has taken us through in his handouts, we need a whole-of-society approach to counter them.

Sustained public education of both the young and old will help to remind us that we are a sovereign nation with our own core interests. This requires a consciously planned and sustainable approach so that Singaporeans are aware that other countries have their own agenda and our national interests are not necessarily aligned with theirs. 

For example, some countries, to further their own agenda, may insidiously play up the cultural affinity card. They may, for example, appeal to Singaporeans of a particular ethnicity to share with their friends their pride in that country’s military and economic progress, and chastise their own government for not showing sufficient deference to them.

This goes against our national interest, yet the vectors of this campaign may not even realise it. Issuing directions under FICA to block the transmission of their messages may be like cutting off the head of the mythical Hydra — a new head will grow again, until these Singaporeans are convinced that they have been deceived. This is not something that a legislative hammer like FICA can easily achieve.

We need more frank and open discussions about the tactics used by foreign powers to influence our population, so that Singaporeans will recognise them and will not unknowingly spread foreign propaganda without realising their goals and origins.

As a small country which seeks to be friends with all countries large and small, it is sometimes inconvenient for the Government to front public education and lead discussions of this nature. Some countries might bristle at being called out by the Singapore government and this could impact diplomatic relations.

Academic institutions, NGOs, researchers and even schoolteachers should step forward to play a greater role in this national effort. These independent organisations and individuals will have more freedom to educate the public or their students without being seen by foreign powers as government spokespersons. They can therefore be more candid in sharing their views, even in public forums, without Singapore incurring the ire of other countries. Government agencies, especially MFA, MINDEF and MHA, should regularly engage these groups and individuals in closed door sessions, to share the Government’s perspectives on our core interests, but without dictating what they should or should not do.

Investigative reporting and the free press

Many incidents of foreign influence operations in other countries like Australia, Sweden and the US came to light because of investigative reporting by their free press.

A former US national security adviser resigned after journalists investigated and reported about his contacts with Russia. He was later charged and pleaded guilty to lying to the FBI. 

Sweden’s ambassador to China was recalled and investigated after the daughter of a Chinese-Swedish bookseller jailed in China made a blog post, which was reported in the media, revealing that the ambassador had commissioned businessmen to negotiate a sensitive case involving her father without the knowledge of the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The ambassador was later prosecuted in Sweden but acquitted due to insufficient proof.

The PAP Government has rejected the notion of the press being the Fourth Estate, which scrutinises the actions of public officials and public institutions in the public interest, calling for accountability for their actions. This could handicap our efforts to weed out hostile foreign interference. We cannot rely only on legislation, or law enforcement and intelligence agencies to stem foreign interference. 

Given the risk that foreign interference poses to a small and open country like Singapore, we need to use more tools in our arsenal to counter it. By drawing on a wide range of intelligence, including research and exposure by the press, we are made more secure, not less. A free press which invests in investigative journalism can shine the light on shady activities, as well as inform and educate the public and policymakers about hostile information campaigns taking place on our shores.

Conclusion

Mr Speaker, the approach taken by FICA amounts to using a sledgehammer to crack one bad nut at the expense of perhaps a dozen good ones. Yet in the area of preventing elite capture, it falls short compared to foreign lobbying laws in other countries.

My Workers’ Party colleagues and I have proposed some very reasonable amendments to the Bill to prevent overreach, ensure greater transparency and provide more judicial oversight. With these amendments, FICA will retain all its teeth to keep foreign interference at bay, while assuring Singaporeans that its fangs will not be used unjustly against our own citizens.

I appeal to this House to seriously consider these amendments and approve them for the benefit of all Singaporeans and our future as a country. 

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Could the Govt have been better prepared for re-opening?

I asked the Minister for Health the following supplementary question during Question Time today (4 Oct 2021) in Parliament:

Many Singaporeans and businesses are very frustrated with the repeated open-shut of the economy and their lives. Minister Ong said on 21 Sep that during the preparatory period, MOH projected handling 100-200 cases a day. This is far lower than the actual numbers since 19 Aug. Why were these projections so far off? Delta has been with us for almost 6 months and there is plenty of data on Delta infections from countries like India and Israel which were hit by the Delta wave earlier than us. Why wasn’t the Government better prepared for the caseload after re-opening?

The Minister’s reply will be published in the Hansard within two weeks.

SMS hijacking of credit card transactions

There were recent reports of local bank customers having funds stolen from their accounts because of criminals overseas using a technique called “SMS diversion” to obtain the SMS one-time passwords (OTP) sent by banks to verify a credit card transactions.

I have filed a question for the Minister to reply on behalf of the Monetary Authority of Singapore to ask how MAS is working with banks and telcos to prevent criminal hijacking of OTPs. This involves compromising of overseas telecommunication networks and may be out of Singapore’s jurisdiction.

I also asked if MAS will require banks to proactively reach out to customers affected by such schemes and reimburse them for any losses resulting from these criminal acts. Unlike situations where bank customers are tricked into communicating their OTPs to scammers, SMS hijacking happens without their knowledge.

Since SMS is vulnerable to being hijacked, it might be prudent for banks to give customers the option to disable SMS verification of purchases so they use only their banking app to verify purchases.

This is the full text of my question, to be answered on 4 Oct 2021 in Parliament:

Mr Gerald Giam Yean Song: To ask the Prime Minister (a) how is MAS working with banks and telecommunications companies to prevent hijacking of the one-time passwords (OTPs) sent by banks via SMS; and (b) whether MAS will require banks to (i) proactively reach out to customers affected by such schemes given customers may be unaware of these transactions taking place and (ii) reimburse customers for any losses resulting from hijacking of SMS OTPs.