Latest "terrorist" detentions: Some questions

On June 9, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) made a shock announcement that it had detained a young lawyer, Abdul Basheer s/o Abdul Karim, and 4 alleged Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) operatives under the Internal Security Act (ISA) in February. Information from the press release is scant, and raises many questions. DPYadav has asked his questions on his blog. Here are mine:


1. According to MHA, in Oct 2006, Abdul Basheer “left Singapore for a Middle-East country” where he had made plans to fly to Pakistan, contact the Pakistani terrorist group Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), train for “militant jihad” and the cross over to Afghanistan to fight alongside the Taliban. But before he could do that, he was arrested there and repatriated to Singapore.

Which Middle East country was Abdul Basheer arrested in? This has revealed a very close state of cooperation between Singapore and that country for the latter to be willing to arrest someone who had legally committed no crime, and “render” him to Singapore. Do we have an extradition agreement with this country? If not, did Singapore and the Middle East country act within international law in executing this rendition? (Recall the scandal that the US was embroiled in with its CIA renditions of terrorism suspects from Eastern Europe to Guantanamo Bay.)


2. There has been much emphasis by the Government that these latest arrests must not be allowed to harm race relations in Singapore. The implicit concern is that the Chinese majority may suspect their Malay neighbours (including the educated ones) of being extremists too. Several Malay community leaders and academics were quoted in the press condemning Abdul Basheer for his actions so as to ally any fears felt by the other communities. However, it was never mentioned that Abdul Basheer is not Malay. He is an Indian Muslim.

Even Home Affairs Minister Wong Kan Seng seems to have missed this fact, when during a grassroots event on June 9, he was quoted as saying, “We must not over-react…Our Malay-Muslim community in general are moderate people.”

An article in TODAY on June 9 stated that “the arrest took the Malay community by surprise”. Unwittingly, an Asia Sentinel article wrongly referred to Abdul Basheer as a “Malay lecturer”.

Why was there no effort by the Government and the media to point out that he is not Malay? The numerous articles written about how this well-educated lawyer could turn out to be a radical is has probably reinforced in many people’s minds that even the Malay community’s best and brightest are not spared from problems of radicalisation. These are the kind of things stick in people’s minds, whether consciously or sub-consciously. It is therefore quite unfair to the Malay community that Abdul Basheer isn’t Malay but has been widely assumed to be so.


3. From a legal perspective, Abdul Basheer has not broken any law, a point that Brother Michael Broughton of the Singapore Inter-Religious Organisation raised. He was legally in that Middle Eastern country studying Arabic and he had bought an air ticket to Pakistan. Based on MHA’s statement, he had not contacted the militant LeT yet, and even if he had, that in itself would not be a criminal offence.

So why the rush to arrest him without any evidence of criminal wrongdoing? Was it just to save Internal Security Department (ISD) officers (and their external spy counterparts) the trouble of tracking him and gathering evidence on his alleged planned militant activities? Or was there a genuine reason to believe that was the last chance they had to apprehend him? Would they have arrested him so soon if the Government didn’t have the ISA, which gives the Home Affairs Minister almost absolute power to detain someone indefinitely, even without evidence that can stand up to scrutiny in an open court?

I don’t disagree with DPM Wong’s argument that someone who has gone on a jihad in Afghanistan poses a threat when he comes back home. Neither do I think it is ok “if a Singaporean kills or plans to kill others in terrorist acts abroad, so long as those who die are not Singaporeans”. But the intention to “make contact” with LeT does not automatically mean that he will become an Afghan jihadi. Would LeT have even accepted some unknown Singaporean with no jihadi credentials into their fold in the first place?


4. There is much speculation about how the Internet played a significant role in radicalising Abdul Basheer. Yes, there is a lot of extremist stuff out there which can be quite mesmerizing — scenes of “martyrs” blowing up US troops in Iraq with Arabic music playing in the background, compelling essays (in English) of how the “Zionists” (i.e., Israelis) are killing Palestinian women and children, online communities of radicals feeding off each others’ hate, etc. But is this really what can turn an intelligent, educated Singaporean into a terrorist? According to a New Paper article, a former classmate said she bumped into him sometime in 2005 and he had grown a beard and was clad in a religious outfit. He also had a bruise on his forehead which he said was caused by pressing his head hard to the ground while praying. That speaks of a deeply spiritual experience that he had gone through — something that does not simply happen by surfing the Net in your bedroom. There must have been someone or several people who were closely “discipling” him through his spiritual transition. Have these mentors been identified and are the authorities monitoring them to ensure they do not produce more disciples like Abdul Basheer?


5. The Straits Times article “extremism.net” (June 16) pointed out that psychologists believe the transition of a Netizen from terrorist sympathiser to terrorist stems from the state of mind of the individual even before he enters Cyberspace. An expert said that it was likely that an episode in his life caused him to “lose faith in the innate rightness of the status quo”.

I recall a dorm-mate in my freshman year in university in the US who was an Iranian born Briton. He spoke with a crisp English accent, but had nothing but expletives to describe the Brits. He told us how in boarding school he was ragged and abused on the basis of his national origin. This experience was evidently the cause of his intense anger against the Brits, whom he said were “all f****** racist”. Could Abdul Basheer have gone through something like this growing up as a minority in Singapore, that personally hurt him and caused him to want to take up arms to fight against “infidels”?


I don’t expect that there would be ready answers to any of these questions. But I hope readers can share their views on this issue.

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Related reading:

Lack of Critical Thinking Not Internet is the Problem by Bernard Leong

Indonesia playing punk with us again

MFA Spokesman’s Comments on remarks by Indonesian Minister of Defence Prof Juwono Sudarsono

In response to media queries on remarks by Indonesian Minister of Defence Prof Juwono Sudarsono, who was quoted as saying that Indonesia’s ratification of the Defence Cooperation Agreement was held up because Singapore had rejected Indonesia’s proposal for training arrangements to be determined jointly by the two sides, the MFA Spokesman said:

“We are puzzled by Prof Juwono’s statement that Singapore wants to decide by itself the military training arrangements in Indonesia.

Indonesia and Singapore had negotiated the Extradition Treaty (ET), and the Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA) and four associated Implementing Arrangements (IAs) as one package. This package of agreements was agreed to and completed at a meeting of their Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence, and their armed forces chiefs on 23 April 2007. It was on this basis that the ET, DCA and Military Training Area IA were signed on 27 April 2007 in Bali in the presence of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong. At Indonesia’s request, however, the date for the signing of the three remaining IAs was deferred to 7 May 2007, purely for administrative and logistical reasons. The TNI explained that it could not get all three Indonesian Service Chiefs to be present on 27 April. Unfortunately, the signing on 7 May 2007 did not materialise, because just before it was due to take place Indonesia requested changes to the IAs which Singapore could not agree to.

The package of agreements was settled after comprehensive negotiations between the relevant agencies on both sides, including the defence ministries and armed forces of Indonesia and Singapore. Since the time negotiations commenced in October 2005, both sides had ample opportunity to raise any matter of concern for discussion, prior to the conclusion of the carefully balanced set of agreements on 23 April 2007. Indonesia did not raise these issues then. But after the conclusion of the package, Indonesia asked for substantive changes and new conditions to what had already been agreed upon in the DCA and IAs, as reflected in Prof Juwono’s remarks.

Singapore’s position is that the agreements are already settled, and the terms cannot be changed casually or piecemeal, without risking the whole package of ET and DCA unravelling. Nevertheless, in the interests of good relations between the two countries, Singapore had earlier conveyed to Indonesia our proposal on how we can move forward on this issue, and we are waiting for Indonesia’s response to our proposal.”

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
SINGAPORE
13 JUNE 2007

This is a worrying escalation of “megaphone diplomacy”, whereby Singapore and Indonesia are now negotiating through the mass media, instead of through more discreet diplomatic channels.

Let me hazard a guess as to what’s going on behind the scenes (the following may or may not be true, but it’s my assessment of what I think is most likely):

1. Singapore made an earlier than expected announcement that it was ready to sign the ET and DCA, and Indonesia got rushed into signing even though they didn’t want to sign the DCA, because there is much domestic expectation that the ET should be signed asap.

2. Now we learn that the Indons tried to play punk by claiming their military chiefs couldn’t make it to the 27 April signing. That is absolute rubbish! You mean the president, defence minister and foreign minister can make it, but the generals can’t? I mean, how big shot can a general possibly be? So why can’t the defence minister sign on their behalf. They must think the Singapore officials were stupid not to call their bluff in the first place. Singapore probably knew it, but just swallowed it.

3. Juwono alleged that Indonesia “proposed that training arrangements be determined jointly by the TNI (Indonesian military) and Singapore. Singapore rejected it, saying they should decide for themselves, despite the fact that the exercises will be conducted on our territory” — that is ludicrous! I know Singapore officials are often pushy and arrogant, but they would never insist on something outrageous like conducting military training in another country without the host country’s 100% concurrence.

4. After 27 April, Indonesia probably proposed some vague clause that could effectively invalidate the whole DCA because they can just use it to delay the DCA’s execution indefinitely. Naturally Singapore rejected the change. Also there’s a principle to stick to. If they agreed to it before, why should we allow them to suka suka make a change like that?

5. “Puzzled” in Singapore diplomatic speak means more like “the fella is trying to shift goal posts and go back on what we previously agreed on”.

Holocaust conference in Indonesia gives room for hope


Holocaust-affirming conference opens in Indonesia
Straits Times, 12 June 2007

JIMBARAN – A UNIQUE conference aiming to promote religious tolerance and affirming the reality of the Jewish Holocaust opened on Tuesday in Indonesia, the world’s most populous Muslim nation.

The conference on the resort island of Bali attended by rabbis, Holocaust witnesses and Muslim leaders is styling itself as an ‘anti-conference of Teheran”, where a December 2006 meet cast doubt on the genocide of Jews during World War II, triggering worldwide condemnation.

Chairing the discreetly-organised conference is former Indonesian president Abdurrahman Wahid, known as Gus Dur, a moderate Islamic leader known to take courageous positions in Indonesia, where Muslims are known for their tolerance but small hardline groups still hold considerable political sway.

‘Although I am a good friend of Mahmud Ahmadinejad, I have to say he is wrong,’ Gus Dur told the conference, referring to the Iranian president’s dismissal of the Holocaust as a myth.

‘He falsified history … I believe the Holocaust happened,’ he said.

The former president has been a member of the Tel Aviv-based Shimon Peres Peace Institute since 1984 and has drawn fire for his support for direct trade relations between Indonesia and Israel.

Read more…

I think it’s great that a conference like this is taking place in the world largest Muslim nation. I had no idea that Gus Dur had been a member of a Jewish peace institute for the last 23 years.

I wonder if the current Indonesian establishment had anything to do with this conference, which is chaired by Gus Dur. Whatever it is, if the conference goes ahead smoothly, it will definitely enhance Indonesia’s reputation as a moderate Muslim-majority country, a reputation that has taken a severe beating since the Bali bombings and 9/11.

Let’s hope that the Islamist extremists in Indonesia don’t start calling up hotels in Bali and threatening guests, and demonstrating and shouting “Allahu Akbar” in front of the conference venue. CNN is bound to jump on that kind of nonsense and broadcast it to the world. In the end, if the conference gets cancelled because of security reasons, it will do more harm to Indonesia and Islam than if it was never planned in the first place.

Acts of irresponsibility cause for concern


Acts of irresponsibility cause for concern
Straits Times forum, 9 June 2007

I REFER to the report, ‘M-cyclist was hit by a car, run over by another’ (ST, June 7). It is sad to read about the behaviour of the two drivers, who callously did not stop to render assistance to the victim.

Whatever reasons there might be (e.g., running an errand, fear), these paled in significance when a life was at stake, especially when one was responsible for the situation.

The recent spate of reports on personal misconduct or sheer irresponsibility (e.g., hit-and-run accidents, drink driving, senseless violent behaviour over inconsequential matters and self-absorbed acts) highlights some contemporary social values which could be taking root in our society.

While these might be isolated incidents, they warrant concern because the individuals spanned the age spectrum.

We live in a hedonistic age, where personal success is now measured by social status and wealth. The detrimental effects on our social consciousness arising from the pursuit of instant self-gratification and one-upmanship are becoming more and more evident.

However, unlike in the past, inculcation of the values of delayed gratification, self-denial and concern for others can no longer be left to government social campaigns.

After all, personal behaviour is not the responsibility of the Government, but of the individual himself. Ultimately, one has to bear the consequences of one’s choices.

As for children, it is vital that parents or even adults set a good example. As the Chinese saying goes, ‘if the upper beam is not straight, the lower one will be slanted too’.

Hence, it gives one hope to read about fellow citizens going the extra mile to do the right thing. Such examples of personal accountability and social responsibility are truly worthy of commendation and emulation.

The ‘slouch towards Gomorrah’ does not happen overnight, but on a gradual basis when we allow certain values to take root, or condone certain behaviour.

Once these values take root, we will be increasingly desensitised to such behaviour, and gradually become a self-absorbed citizenry.

It would be ironic if our social fabric, which was carefully built upon the traditional values of our forefathers, is so carelessly withered away by those who come after.

Tan Eng Tat
Beijing, China

This was a well-written letter by one of my friends and ex-colleagues.

It seems that the blistering pursuit of growing the economy and pragmatism (instead of idealism) has already led to our society becoming so self-absorbed that symptoms are being seen in so many areas of life in Singapore. From not giving up seats on the MRT to pregnant women and playing loud music on the train, to a lack of civic consciousness, political apathy and a general indifference to anything in society that doesn’t directly benefit oneself or one’s family.

Things have got to change, if we are to progress (not just economically) as a society.


Myanmar regime belongs in the dog house

The extension of the imprisonment of Myanmar’s pro-democracy leader, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, on 27 May 2007 was a widely expected move by the country’s military government, which has already kept her under detention for most of the 17 years since her party won the national elections by a landslide in 1990.

While Indonesia, Philippines and Malaysia (and occasionally Singapore) have voiced their dissatisfaction with the lack of democratic progress in Myanmar, there is still a lot more that the countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) can and should do to push the regime towards the path of democracy. ASEAN’s continued reluctance to take concrete action against Myanmar has only served to embolden the Myanmar generals’ sense of invincibility and reinforce the commonly held view that ASEAN is a “toothless tiger”.

Background

Myanmar (also known as Burma) was admitted as a member of ASEAN in 1997 with the support of the grouping’s most influential members — Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. This was despite protests from Western governments and Aung San Suu Kyi herself that admitting Myanmar was tantamount to endorsing the junta’s despotic ways. However, ASEAN had its reasons for admitting Myanmar, despite the latter’s dismal human rights record.

Firstly, ASEAN governments saw the expansion of the grouping from six original members (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) to 10 members (with the addition of Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam) as a way to increase its attractiveness as an investment destination. With over 567 million people and a combined gross domestic product of over US$1 trillion, “ASEAN-10” is trying to make itself an attractive alternative to China and India.

Secondly, ASEAN felt it was imperative to engage Myanmar to prevent it from drawing too close to China, which ASEAN countries have always been wary of. China views Myanmar as a country of strategic significance, providing it with much needed access to the Indian Ocean.

For Singapore, which pooh-poohs abstract notions of human rights and democracy in favour of hard-nosed economic pragmatism, Myanmar provides a sizeable export market, particularly for its military equipment and ordnance. (Singapore has long been a major supplier of arms to Myanmar.)

Some analysts have speculated that the admission of Myanmar was the ASEAN leaders’ way of asserting the supposed superiority of “Asian values” and a rejection of Western governments’ attempts to impose “alien” values of liberal democracy on the region. At that time, Southeast Asian economies were brimming with confidence and optimism on the wings of phenomenal growth rates over the previous decade. In an almost Titanic-like turn of events, however, all this came crumbling down just a few weeks after Myanmar was admitted to ASEAN. The sudden devaluation of the Thai baht led to a regional economic meltdown known as the Asian Financial Crisis.

To garner support Myanmar’s admission, ASEAN governments promoted the idea that so-called “constructive engagement” of the regime rather than isolation and sanctions would be a more effective way of prodding the generals to behave according to internationally-accepted norms. Ten years on, constructive engagement of Myanmar has proven to be an abject failure. The level of oppression of the opposition and people in Myanmar has increased, rather than abated, since its admission into ASEAN.

The Myanmar thorn

Since coming into the ASEAN fold, Myanmar has been a thorn in ASEAN’s relations with its major trading partners, the European Union (EU) and the US. Because of Myanmar’s membership in ASEAN, a number of ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meetings have been cancelled or downgraded. These were lost opportunities for ASEAN as the meetings could have further enhanced ASEAN’s political and economic relations with the world’s most important trading block.

Myanmar has also proven to be a impediment to talks on an ASEAN-EU Free Trade Agreement (FTA). It is virtually impossible for the EU to consider an FTA with ASEAN while maintaining trade sanctions against Myanmar for human rights abuses.

Meanwhile, a trade and investment pact with US was postponed several times because of Washington’s reluctance to have anything to do with Myanmar’s generals. Eventually, the US did sign a watered-down Trade and Investment Framework Arrangement (TIFA) with ASEAN.

In 2005, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice broke with tradition and skipped the annual ASEAN-led security meeting known as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), signalling Washington’s displeasure over the lack of democratic progress in Myanmar.

Perhaps the biggest threat that Myanmar poses to ASEAN is its potential to derail the grouping’s bold plans to achieve regional economic integration
by 2015. With its moribund economy and lack of progress on almost all aspects of development, Myanmar is likely to be a huge stumbling block to economic integration, which requires a minimum degree of parity in economic development between member states in order to be successful.

Wake up call for ASEAN

Condoleezza Rice’s snub of the 2005 ARF was a wake up call for ASEAN governments, as it dawned on them how much of a liability Myanmar was turning out to be. The leadership of ASEAN is rotated annually among its 10 members. The most important responsibility of the ASEAN chair is to host all the major ASEAN meetings, including the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, the ASEAN Summit, the ARF and the East Asian Summit (which involves Australia, New Zealand and India).

Of these meetings, the ARF is probably the most significant as it involves ASEAN’s “Dialogue Partners”, including the US, the EU, China and Russia. It was a no brainer that any meetings held in Yangon (Myanmar’s capital) would be skipped by the US, the EU and probably Australia and New Zealand.

To stave off this looming crisis, ASEAN foreign ministers in 2005 took an unprecedented move to strongly hint to Myanmar that it voluntarily forego its turn as ASEAN chairman. This was probably the furthest ASEAN has got to breaking its tradition of “non-interference” in the domestic affairs of member states. Fortunately, Myanmar got the hint and did give up its chairmanship, although the option still remains open for it to reclaim its turn at a future rotation.

Put them “in the dog house”

By this time, ASEAN leaders were starting to openly voice their frustration at the continued recalcitrance of the Myanmar junta, and their unpredictable behaviour. On 1 June, during the Shangri La Dialogue (an annual security forum in held in Singapore), Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong told the audience, “We (ASEAN) have exercised our influence, persuaded, encouraged, cajoled the authorities in Myanmar to move and adapt to the world which is leaving them behind. The impact has been limited.”

He admitted that “Myanmar is a problem. It’s a problem for ASEAN, it’s a problem for Myanmar itself”. He continued, “We can take a strident position and say well, we will condemn you, we will shut you off, we will embargo you, we will put you in a dog house. Will we make things better? Will we cause things to change? I don’t believe so.”

These unusually bitter words coming from a Singapore leader were carried by Reuters and Associated Press, but were conspicuously absent from Singapore’s newspapers, including The Straits Times.

It is true that ASEAN’s influence over Myanmar is limited. Even without ASEAN’s support, Myanmar can still count on the support of its two giant neighbours, China and India, who are competing with each other to give more money, aid and weapons to the regime in order to exercise more influence over that strategically located nation.

It was a colossal mistake for ASEAN to have admitted Myanmar into the fold in the first place. Although that is now water under the bridge, ASEAN’s continued reluctance to take concrete action against Myanmar has only served to embolden the Myanmar generals’ sense of invincibility and reinforce the commonly held view that ASEAN is a “toothless tiger”.

Myanmar rightly belongs in the dog house. Some parliamentarians from ASEAN countries have called on ASEAN to suspend their membership. However, none of the ASEAN countries appear ready to support this very harsh measure. They would reason that if Myanmar can be suspended because of foreign pressure, then the same might happen to their own countries in the future.

If ASEAN stops defending Myanmar (for example when the EU refuses to give the Myanmar representative a seat at ASEAN-EU conferences), the generals may realise that they cannot gain anything more from remaining in ASEAN, and might decide to voluntarily withdraw Myanmar from the grouping. This would save ASEAN the dilemma of deciding whether or not to suspend Myanmar.

Should Myanmar remain obstinate, and move even further away from its “roadmap to democracy”, ASEAN should take a bold step to bite the bullet and suspend them, lest Myanmar becomes a millstone around ASEAN’s neck which eventually drags down the grouping. At a minimum, ASEAN governments should break their traditional silence and speak more strongly against the behaviour of the Myanmar regime.

The ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Myanmar Caucus (AIPMC) has repeatedly called for the release of Daw Suu Kyi and for ASEAN’s ties with Myanmar to be suspended should they fail to do so. (The AIPMC includes of lawmakers from Cambodia, Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and an MP-elect from Myanmar.) Since ASEAN governments find it difficult to take a more strident tone on Myanmar, the AIPMC provides a good alternative voice of ASEAN, especially since it consists of elected MPs from member states. Therefore, the profile of the AIPMC should be enhanced and their statements given more coverage by the media.

However, at the end of the day, ASEAN governments will see no compelling reason to act against M
yanmar unless their electorates take a keener interest in the issue and call on their governments to stop turning a blind eye to the plight of Myanmar’s suffering people. Malaysian opposition leader Lim Kit Siang probably expressed it best, when he once remarked that “ASEAN cannot be expected to be forced to promote democratization in Burma until democratization itself has taken deep and firm root in the majority of ASEAN nations[1].”

This article first appeared in The Online Citizen. It was also published by Malaysiakini on June 19 and OhMyNews International on June 22.

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[1] Lim KS, “Drugs and the battle for democratization”, in From Consensus to Controversy: ASEAN’s relationship with Burma’s Slorc, Bangkok: Alternative ASEAN Network on Burma, 1997.

Some further reading:

The £400,000 London Olympics logo

This is the newly unveiled London 2012 Olympics logo that has attracted much controversy. Some remarked that it looks like a broken swastika. I personally think it is absolutely ghastly (as a Brit would say). BBC reported that they spent £400,000 on the logo. Wow, maybe it’s not so bad after all that Singapore spent S$400,000 to rename Marina Bay…Marina Bay. At least Marina Bay sounds nice. :)

Auditor General’s Report: Millions Missing

This is an exclusive from The Online Citizen:


The original Auditor General Office’s (AGO) audit of 12 Ministries and associated statutory boards has revealed irregularities to an extent not fully revealed by the recent Public Accounts Committee (PAC).

According to the AGO, losses of public monies added up to $6.2 million, a substantial amount of which is still unaccounted for.

The Auditor General’s preface to the report states that ‘This audit approach is not intended to reveal all errors and irregularities.’

In the report, the Ministry of Law lost a potential $77,666.64 safety deposit because its computer system could only register sums to the nearest dollar. It appears under the header ‘No $77,666.64 security deposit because of 36 cents’.

The report details how these millions were lost in a detailed account of mistakes and dubious practices.

Read the entire report on The Online Citizen.

S’pore-Indon treaties: Is the light at the end of the tunnel a train?

I’m back after a one-and-a-half month absence. This is an article which I wrote for The Online Citizen.

——————-

Indonesia has been seeking an Extradition Treaty (ET) with Singapore for the past 34 years.

However, since the 1997-98 Asian Financial Crisis this issue has risen to the top of Indonesia’s foreign policy agenda with Singapore. During the crisis, it is believed that many corrupt Indonesian businessmen absconded to Singapore with millions of dollars stolen from banks. has asked for “variations” to the agreement.

During Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s state visit to Singapore in February 2005, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong made a surprise announcement that Singapore was “committed to having an extradition treaty with Indonesia“. The negotiations on the ET kicked off in March 2005.

Background

Eight months later, in October 2005, PM Lee got President Yudhoyono to agree to a quid pro quo: a new Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA) would be negotiated and signed in tandem with the ET. This DCA would, inter alia, provide the SAF with much needed training areas in Indonesia and provide for more joint military exercises between the SAF and the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI).

In January this year, unhappy with what they perceived to be foot-dragging on the ET by Singapore, Indonesia slapped a ban on all sand (and apparently some granite) exports to Singapore, a move which threatened to cripple Singapore’s struggling construction industry.

Indonesia’s official reason for the ban was that of “resource conservation”, but an Indonesian foreign ministry official let the cat out of the bag when he said publicly that the move was aimed at pressuring Singapore to sign the ET. By then most of the details of the ET had already been settled. What remained was to negotiate the details of the DCA, which is the package that Singapore wants in exchange for the ET.

Eventually, on 27 April, the two treaties were signed by the respective foreign and defence ministers in Bali, amidst much fanfare and optimism that a bone of contention in our relations was finally removed — or so we thought. However, there are still several hurdles that need to be crossed before this issue can be considered settled.

Hurdles still yet to be crossed

Firstly, there are still some supplementary agreements which are part of the DCA which have not been signed. The original deadline in early May for signing these additional documents has lapsed. Singapore’s Ministry of Defence (MINDEF) reported that there were some “unexpected difficulties” because Indonesia has asked for “variations” to the agreement.

According to Indonesia’s Antara News Agency, the legalisation of the implementation arrangements of the DCA has been “postponed indefinitely”.

Secondly, the two agreements need to be ratified by the Indonesian House of Representatives (the DPR) before they can be implemented. While lawmakers there have indicated they are ready to sign the ET, senior MPs from many of the major parties have strongly asserted that they will not ratify the DCA, as they claim it would “undermine Indonesia’s sovereignty”. This display of nationalistic fervour is to be expected from MPs who feel a need to pander to their constituents. Indonesian Defence Minister Juwono Sudarsono already told his Golkar Party members on 21 May, “Do not worry. Trust me as the commander of the TNI with regard to…the protection of national interests and our sovereignty.” He will have to repeat this several times more when he defends his government’s decision in front of the DPR on 28 May.

Thirdly, even if the ET comes into effect and the Indonesian attorney-general hands over his list of suspects for extradition, Singapore is not going to be able to simply arrest them and hand them over to the Indonesians. There are caveats in the ET that allow Singapore to refuse extradition if it suspects that the charges are politically or racially motivated. Stringent legal procedures and judicial processes will have to be followed when an extradition request is made, and Indonesia’s police and judicial processes will be subject to review by Singaporean judges and vice versa.

Furthermore, it has been 10 years since the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, and it is likely that any stolen money brought into Singapore has already been laundered, making it very difficult to pinpoint its origin. In other cases, the suspect might have changed nationalities or left Singapore years ago. Thus, it could well turn out that none of the people on Indonesia’s wanted list will ever get extradited.

Senior Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Zainul Abidin Rasheed told Parliament on 21 May that both agreements will have to come into force together, as he tried to allay MPs’ concerns that the Government was rushed into signing the ET before the DCA was finalised.

In Singapore, the Cabinet (not Parliament) has the authority to ratify treaties. An option open for Singapore now would be for the Cabinet to refuse to ratify the ET until the Indonesian DPR ratifies the DCA.

Although the signing of the ET appears on the surface to have paved the way for warmer bilateral relations between Singapore and Indonesia, we are no where near the end of the tunnel.

In fact, it is entirely possible that even more problems will surface once the ET comes into force, leading to more frustration among Indonesians who think the ET is the magical elixir that will solve their endemic corruption problems.

Now S’pore copies M’sia: Bans another film

It seems that the Singaporean and Malaysian governments have taken on a whole new meaning to “bilateral cooperation” by aping each others’ moves in banning political films.

Just 3 weeks ago, the Malaysian government turned down the appeal by filmmaker Amir Muhammad against the ban on his film about Malay communists, Apa Khabar Orang Kampung (The Village People Road Show). The Malaysian government cited, among other things, that the film “blatantly” criticises the Malaysian government and it “shows the opinions and stories only of the communists”. This came barely a year after the Malaysian Home Affairs Ministry banned the film, Lelaki Komunis Terahkir (The Last Communist), a film about former Malayan Communist Party chief Chin Peng, under their Film Censorship Act. Interestingly, that film was passed without any cuts by the National Film Censorship board in March 2006 but the Home Ministry retracted the approval ten days before film was scheduled to start screening.

In an almost copycat move, the Singapore Ministry of Information, Communications and the Arts (MICA) has just banned local filmmaker Martyn See’s film, Zahari’s 17 Years. The scenarios couldn’t have been more similar. See’s film was about a former Malay newspaper journalist and opposition party president’s arrest and detention under the Internal Security Act on suspicion of “involvement in communist united front activities against the interest of Singapore”.

It is surprisingly coincidental that, just as in the case in Malaysia, See’s film was passed by the Board of Film Censors as “PG” for the Singapore International Film Festival, and now MICA has decided to backtrack and ban the film 3 weeks after the Malaysians banned Amir Muhammad’s film. The reason given by MICA is that it will “undermine public confidence in the Government”. The full text of MICA’s statement can be found on its press release yesterday.

While I hold no sympathy for the communist cause, I believe these alleged communists have served their time in jail (albeit without the benefit of an open trial) and they have lost their war. The harsh actions of the Government back then could in some ways be justified as we were facing an almost insurmountable threat to our nation’s security and survival. But now that the war on communism is over, the truth should be allowed to surface — including the stories from the other side of the fence. It is in the interest of Singapore that young Singaporeans be educated on what went on during those turbulent times in our nation’s history, and arrive at their own judgments.

To ban or not to ban

The Government’s moves and statements on political films appear to be inconsistent at best. In 2005, Martyn See was hauled up by the police for making a documentary about democracy activist Chee Soon Juan, Singapore Rebel. The film was banned on the basis that it was a “party political film” in contravention of the Films Act (Section 33). In an interview with Time magazine in December that year, Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew said in reference to Singapore Rebel: “Well, if you had asked me, I would have said, to hell with it. But the censor, the enforcer, he will continue until he is told the law has changed. And it will change…”. Not surprisingly, eight months later, the police completed their investigations on See and let him off with just a “stern warning”.

In January this year, in an interview on Channel NewsAsia’s BlogTV, Foreign Minister George Yeo, in response to a question by blogger Gayle Goh, said that he was “responsible for that peace of legislation” when he was Information Minister not to allow political videos and films. He said, “We did not want politics in Singapore to be trivialised and so commercial where it all depends on packaging and how much money you are able to put into producing a programme. So we decided keep it simple, keep it cheap.” However, he added that the Government “did not reckon this new media (the Internet) which allows you to produce the programmes quite cheaply. So I think we’ve got to adjust that position.” (Emphasis mine.)

Almost a year-and-a-half has passed since MM Lee’s “to hell with it” remarks and four months since George Yeo’s comment that “we’ve got to adjust that position” on political films. Yet there is still no news from MICA that the Section 33 of the Films Act will be repealed. Instead, this time MICA banned Zahari’s 17 Years using a different section of the Films Act — Section 35 (1) — for the first time. This section of the Act allows the MICA Minister to prohibit the possession or distribution of any film contrary to public interest. With effect from tomorrow, anyone who possesses or distributes the film could be fined up to $10,000 or jailed for a maximum of two years, or both. This sets an unsettling precedent on how MICA intends to regulate political films, even if Section 33 is repealed.

Will “Light touch” still hold?

Martyn See has said he will upload his film onto YouTube if the ban remains. It is unclear whether the government will act against citizens who view the film on YouTube. Does viewing YouTube video streams count as being “in possession” of the film, and will Martyn See be charged for “distribution” of the film? After all, YouTube clips cannot be saved on one’s hard disks, and lawyers might be able to argue over whether the act of uploading a film on YouTube counts as “distribution”, when in effect it is YouTube which is distributing the film via its website. In any case, just like See’s other film, Singapore Rebel, any one of his hundreds of fans overseas can easily upload their copy of the film onto YouTube, and there’s nothing the Government can do about it.

My hunch is that it is unlikely that the Government will want to follow the Thai government in banning YouTube or take any action against people who watch the YouTube clip (if it does get uploaded) in the privacy of their own homes, in light of their pledge to regulate the Internet with a “light touch”. But given the nature of Singapore’s legislation on the media, whereby “the Minister” is given wide-ranging discretionary powers to ban films, it could go either way.


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From TODAY, 11 April 2007


Film on ex-detainee banned

It may undermine public’s confidence in Govt: Mica

Loh Chee Kong
cheekong@mediacorp.com.sg

A FILM about a former journalist detained under the Internal Security Act has been deemed “against public interest” and banned by the Government.

Shot, directed and edited by local film-maker Martyn See, the 50-minute interview-based film, Zahari’s 17 years, centres around the February 1963 arrest and subsequent detention of Mr Said Zahari, a former editor of the Malay-language newspaper Utusan Melayu and president of Parti Rakyat Singapura. Mr Said, then 34, was arrested during Operation Cold Store — a Government security operation against subversive activities — and released in August 1979.

In a statement yesterday, the Ministry of Information, Communications and the Arts (Mica) said the film gives “a distorted and misleading portrayal” of Mr Said’s arrest and detention and was “an attempt (by Mr Said) to exculpate himself from his past involvement in communist united front activities against the interest of Singapore”.

The ministry said Mr See had submitted the film to the Board of Film Censors for classification for screening.

Explaining its decision to use, for the first time, section 35 (1) of the Films Act, Mica added: “The Government will not allow people who had posed a security threat to the country in the past, to exploit the use of films to purvey a false and distorted portrayal of their past actions and detention by the Government. This could undermine public confidence in the Government.”

Section 35 (1) allows the Mica Minister to prohibit the possession or distribution of any film contrary to public interest. With effect from tomorrow, anyone who possesses or distributes the film could be fined up to $10,000 or jailed for a maximum of two years, or both.

When contacted, Mr See, 38, said he found the decision “very strange”.

He said: “I had wanted to screen the film here, but I haven’t decided when and where yet … I need to find out on what basis they are banning it.”

This is the second time in as many years that a film which Mr See had directed has run afoul of the Films Act, which prohibits films with political themes. Last year, after 15 months of investigation, the police gave him a “stern warning” over his documentary about opposition politician Chee Soon Juan, which was banned under a different section of the Films Act.

Last year, Zahari’s 17 years was submitted for the Singapore International Film Festival. At that time, the Board of Film Censors passed the film with a PG rating — traditionally, films at the festival attract a smaller audience than at a general release. But despite the rating, the festival organisers decided not to screen the movie. It has, however, been shown at film festivals in Malaysia and Toronto.

“(The Board of Film Censors) has to explain why they had passed it under “PG” in the first place. If I’m not satisfied with the explanation, I will have to put it up on YouTube,” Mr See said.


Malaysia copying S’pore again


Another example of how other countries (in this case Malaysia) like to emulate our superior system of government, especially with regard to controlling the flow of information. Perhaps we will soon be hearing of debates in Malaysia about raising their ministers’ salaries. After all, Malaysia has a corruption problem right? And we all know that high salaries will eliminate corruption…

Politically-motivated Blogs Must Be Monitored And Registered, Says Zam

SINGAPORE, April 6 (Bernama) — Information Minister Datuk Seri Zainuddin Maidin Friday lent his weight to a proposal to register blog sites, especially those which are politically-motivated.

He said the mainstream media were subjected to registration, monitoring and specific laws, and as such, there was no reason why the same should not apply to blog operators.

“We must know who they are. So there must be laws that will facilitate their identification,” he told reporters here.

However, he said, the need to register blogs with entertainment and social commentary contents might not be as great as politically-motivated ones.

“When people involved in politics want to use blogs for their political interest or when blog operators are politically-motivated, we have to know who they are.

“Politics is meant to gain influence among the people, politics is meant to obtain power. When it comes to power, it’s the people who are in control.

“When the people use the power, they’ll have to identify themselves. They are dishonest if they hide themselves when talking about politics,” he said.

Zainuddin said in the quest for political power, people were willing to resort to slander, disseminate lies, use unauthorised sources or choose not to verify the source of the information.

“This is very dangerous as they are writing and taking steps to gain power. Their objective is to topple the government, widen the reach of their political doctrine and assist any parties for political purposes,” he said.

Zainuddin said he concurred with the monitoring and registration proposal forwarded by the Energy, Water and Communications Ministry.

Zainuddin discussed the blog issue and how the island republic was approaching the matter in a meeting this morning with his counterpart, Information, Communications and the Arts Minister Dr Lee Boon Yang.

The Malaysian minister said Singapore had formulated a mechanism for the registration of blogs which consistently churned out articles on politics.

He pointed out that Singapore had a class licensing framework to supervise new media forms such as blogs, subjecting them to certain code of ethics under the supervision of the Media Development Authority.

A class licence involves the gazetting of the terms and conditions of a particular industry, and anyone who provides the services within the scope of the class licence will be deemed to have read and agreed to the terms and conditions, and would be considered licensed.

Zainuddin felt that the method implemented by Singapore was practical and it could possibly be modified for use in Malaysia.

“We’ll see whether or not this version can be done in Malaysia. I don’t know yet but I feel that the method is a practical one,” he said.

— BERNAMA


Here’s what another Bernama article has to say about the discussions between the Information Ministers from Malaysia and Singapore:

On the issue of new media, including the proliferation of blogs, Zainuddin said the issue was also touched on during the discussion.

“We do not want to control blogs. We just hope for the bloggers to be responsible, and to be held responsible for what they blog…I share this view and I think the Singapore approach is practical,” he said.

Asked to comment, Dr Lee said that Singapore had an advisory council to study the impact of new media, among other things, including the rising popularity and influence of blogs and try to anticipate its impact particularly on the younger generation over the long term.

“We recognise that the blogs are there; that many young people are very enthusiastic about blogging and are becoming very active players in this so-called Web 2.0 where instead of using the Internet to draw information, users are now generating content to be shared with others.

“So this is quite a significant development. As of now, our regulatory approach to the Internet has been a light touch. Our position in terms of new media is that the law of the land applies in the real world as much as in cyberspace,” Dr Lee said.

Read the full article here.