MSE: Free or Low-cost Drinking Water

Committee of Supply Debate 2025, Ministry of Sustainability and the Environment

4 March 2025

More restaurants now charge for plain water, and some price bottled water the same as sugary drinks. This nudges consumers towards sugar-laden beverages, increasing the risk of obesity and diabetes.

Free or low-cost drinking water should be made more widely available across F&B outlets, shopping malls, heartland coffeeshops and public spaces. This supports healthier choices and reduces unnecessary costs for consumers.

I urge MSE to encourage and work with F&B outlets, coffeeshops, and malls to provide free or low-cost drinking water as a best practice.

MSE should also promote a culture of carrying reusable water bottles as part of Singapore’s sustainability efforts. Refilling reusable bottles cuts down our reliance on single-use plastics.

By nudging businesses, building owners and the public towards these norms, we can help Singaporeans stay hydrated while making choices that benefit their health, their wallets, and the environment.

MINDEF: Making NS Value-accretive

Committee of Supply debate in Parliament, 3 Mar 2025

National defence is the primary goal of National Service (NS), but NS should also be an investment in human capital. MINDEF should transform NS into a value-accretive experience for our National Servicemen by ensuring appropriate remuneration, relevant training, and stronger education and career integration.

First, Full-time National Servicemen’s (NSFs) pay should reflect their contributions to national defence. The median NS allowance should be raised to at least $1,600 per month. NSFs in their second year are fully trained, performing operational roles essential to Singapore’s security, yet they continue to receive an “allowance” rather than a salary with CPF.

The argument that duty and employment are mutually exclusive is flawed. SAF regulars are paid market salaries while serving the same national defence mission. NSFs make personal sacrifices, delaying their education, career and—consequently—sometimes even marriage and children, because of NS. Pay that acknowledges these realities will strengthen their commitment to national defence.

MINDEF should also help NSFs transition smoothly to further education by coordinating with universities to reduce delays between their ORD and the start of their studies.

Finally, NS training should, where possible, incorporate training that can benefit NSFs’ future careers, including skills training that can be applied in both military and civilian settings. This way, NS can serve as a launchpad for future opportunities rather than an educational and career detour.

Empowering Mid-Career PMETs in a Changing Economy

Gerald Giam (Aljunied), 27 Feb 2025

Many mid-career professionals, managers, executives and technicians (PMETs) are under pressure. Some are in industries that are shrinking or being disrupted, where jobs are disappearing faster than new ones are created. Others see their roles changing because of automation or artificial intelligence.

Some even face the anxiety of being told to reapply for their own jobs as part of restructuring exercises, effectively forcing them to compete with their colleagues or external candidates for roles they have already been performing. Such practices not only create stress and uncertainty but can also serve as a way for companies to bypass retrenchment obligations while reshuffling their workforce.

While overall employment levels have continued to rise in tandem with a growing population, some displaced workers face difficulties transitioning into a new job at the same skill level and salary. Many struggle to break into growth sectors despite efforts to reskill, as employers often favour candidates with industry-specific experience or are younger. While most employers prioritise merit, some hiring processes may still be influenced by informal networks, creating additional challenges for mid-career jobseekers trying to break into new industries.

The Labour Force 2024 report showed that some 41,200 PMET residents are unemployed and, of these, 10,700 have been unemployed for more than six months. The data also shows that long-term unemployment affects PMETs more than non-PMETs. These PMETs are workers who have spent decades in their industries, built up expertise and contributed to the economy. Many have significant financial responsibilities, including housing loans, children’s education and elderly parents to care for.

When these PMETs get retrenched or step away from the workforce for a period due to caregiving responsibilities, re-entering the job market becomes a daunting challenge. Even those who are currently employed may be preoccupied with day-to-day operational work and get blindsided by technological changes that make their skills obsolete. A worker who had spent years in corporate operations, for instance, may find it difficult to transition into a technology-driven role without a structured pathway to bridge the gap.

Even if they secure interviews, they are often offered roles at significantly reduced salaries, making it difficult to maintain their financial obligations. Some are forced into contract or gig work with little stability or opportunities for development. The longer they remain unemployed or underemployed, the harder it becomes to re-enter the workforce, as employers perceive them as “outdated” or “overqualified” rather than seeing the value of their accumulated skills and experience. Some may drop out of the workforce completely after years of discouragement.

The government has introduced several schemes to help workers upgrade their skills and transition to new jobs. The SkillsFuture Level-Up Programme provides Singaporeans aged 40 and above with $4,000 in SkillsFuture Credit, along with a training allowance of 50% of their average income over the latest available 12-month period, capped at $3,000 a month, for selected long-form full-time courses, and $300 per month for selected part-time courses. The SkillsFuture Jobseeker Support scheme, which bears similarities with the unemployment insurance schemes proposed by the Workers’ Party since 2006, will also offer financial support of up to $6,000 over six months for involuntarily unemployed workers taking part in job search and related activities.

On top of that, career matching services run by Workforce Singapore (WSG) and its partners help jobseekers refine their resumes and prepare for interviews, and in the future, as announced in this Budget, there will be an expanded network of job placement centres at all CDCs. These are important steps, but more needs to be done to ensure mid-career workers secure meaningful employment.

Training and reskilling alone does not ensure job placement. For mid-career workers facing immediate job displacement, waiting year s for the benefits of these programmes to materialise is not a viable option. Many are unable to afford the temporary drop in income that often comes with switching sectors, making it difficult for them to commit to full-time training programmes.

While some industries are shrinking, others—including healthcare, sustainability, and advanced manufacturing—are expanding. Mid-career PMETs should have clearer pathways to transition into these high-demand sectors through structured job placement and industry partnerships.

The Career Conversion Programme (CCP) is designed to help mid-career individuals transition into new jobs or sectors with better long-term prospects through training and salary support. This is a well-intentioned programme. However, there still remain deeper structural barriers that make it difficult for these workers to secure new jobs at comparable skill levels and salaries. The CCP requires employers to hire the workers before they can receive training, presenting the same barriers for jobseekers who are already struggling to get past the initial job screening process.

We need a more structured and targeted job placement programme where mid-career jobseekers can have their applications and CVs reviewed and refined by specialists in their field. These specialists can then actively match and recommend them to employers, including those enrolled in the CCP, increasing their chances of securing a placement. Once hired, these workers can then benefit from the CCP to receive the necessary training and salary support for a smoother transition into their new roles.

Additionally, WSG can introduce structured returnship programmes to help professionals re-enter the workforce after a career break, whether due to retrenchment or caregiving responsibilities. Unlike the CCP, which requires career conversion, these returnship programmes would provide a pathway to employment and mentorship, allowing mid-career professionals to rebuild industry-relevant experience without starting over at entry-level positions.

Conclusion

Mdm Deputy Speaker, mid-career and older PMETs need more structured redeployment pathways and stronger financial support for career transitions. They have spent years contributing to Singapore’s economy. Many have built businesses, trained younger colleagues and helped shape their industries.

Our nation and our economy cannot afford to overlook the experience and skills of these workers. Let’s give every Singaporean who wants to work, retrain and contribute the best possible chance to do so.


Image generated by AI

Maintenance of Racial Harmony Bill, 2nd Reading Debate

Gerald Giam (Aljunied)

4 February 2025

Mr Speaker,

The Maintenance of Racial Harmony Bill (the “Bill”) seeks to address the complexities of race relations in Singapore. It introduces measures to regulate racial discourse, counter foreign interference and strengthen community cohesion. However, it is important this Bill fosters racial harmony without unintentionally stifling essential public discourse and silencing marginalised voices.

Open Dialogue Necessary for Racial Harmony

Racial harmony is a cornerstone of our society, and I think we all agree that it cannot be achieved through legislation alone. Enduring racial harmony requires genuine understanding and open dialogue among all communities.

However, the broad ministerial powers under this Bill risk deterring legitimate public discourse that is essential for fostering inter-communal dialogue to strengthen social cohesion. For instance, public critiques of systemic discrimination or policies affecting certain racial groups could be misconstrued as vilifying or denigrating others, even when the intent is to raise awareness or advocate for positive change. Forums discussing global events like the Israeli-Palestinian conflict or domestic policies such as CECA—the Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement—could risk being labelled as racially inflammatory, despite their role in constructive discourse.

It is important to distinguish between speech that incites hatred and violence—which should be prevented—and speech that fosters understanding and calls out racial inequalities—which we should encourage. Constructive conversations, including in public forums, are necessary for addressing racial issues and strengthening inter-communal trust.

While the Bill includes defences for private communication and calling out racism in good faith, individuals may still be uncertain about their practical application. The need to prove good faith intent or the private nature of a conversation could create hesitation to engage in discussions on race. This uncertainty may discourage open dialogue and cause such conversations to go underground, or in echo chambers within the internet.

Since the legislative intent as expressed during this debate may be referenced by the Courts, could the Minister clarify, with specific examples, the types of speech—including the ones I raised—that will or will not fall within the scope of this legislation?

I note that unlike the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act, which explicitly prohibits the mixing of religion and politics, this Bill does not contain a similar prohibition on the mixing of race and politics. Can the Minister confirm then that members of the public can engage in public discussions on racial issues without an outright legal restriction?

Countering Foreign Influence

Foreign influence operations can exploit racial and communal fault lines, destabilising our society and undermining social cohesion. Countering foreign interference is a necessary component of maintaining racial harmony. The ability to monitor and regulate race-based entities, and to take action against harmful external influences, is an important step in protecting Singapore’s racial harmony and national security, and I acknowledge the government’s efforts in addressing this issue.

The Bill introduces measures such as designating entities and issuing restraining orders. The Workers’ Party supports the inclusion of these provisions. It is important, however, that these powers are exercised judiciously, with transparency and accountability, to maintain public trust. Ensuring that decisions are seen as fair and impartial will be crucial to the effectiveness and legitimacy of these measures.

Community Remedial Initiative

I support the introduction of the Community Remedial Programme (CRP), which offers an alternative to prosecution by encouraging participants to reflect on their actions and fostering rehabilitation. To be effective, the programme should engage participants in meaningful dialogue with members of other racial groups, allowing for deeper understanding and reflection on the impact of their actions.

Could the Minister share more details on the structure and content of the CRP? How will its effectiveness be measured to ensure it leads to genuine rehabilitation and behavioural change?

Consultation Process

Unlike the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act in 1990, this Bill did not undergo the same level of parliamentary scrutiny through a Select Committee. Instead, the government feedback unit, REACH, conducted a public consultation last year, but the feedback collected remains largely opaque, with only summarised data shared publicly. A Select Committee provides a more transparent and rigorous process, allowing for in-depth scrutiny, public engagement and expert input, particularly from minority communities most affected by such legislation.

The government’s Forward Singapore report underscores the need to strengthen our social compact through deeper citizen engagement. Yet, for an issue as fundamental as race relations, bypassing the Select Committee process weakens participatory democracy. A strong democratic system requires more than just electoral participation—it must also ensure meaningful avenues for policymaking input, robust public consultations and rigorous legislative scrutiny.

The government should uphold these principles by ensuring that future legislation of similar significance is subject to the full scrutiny of a Select Committee.

Conclusion

Mr Speaker, the Workers’ Party supports the Maintenance of Racial Harmony Bill, particularly measures to counter foreign interference, but we urge the government to ensure that safeguards are in place to protect civil liberties and encourage open conversations about race. Thank you.


Image on inter-racial dialogue – generated by AI

Protection from Scams Bill

7 Jan 2025

Mr Speaker,

Scams are wreaking havoc on the lives and life savings of many Singaporeans. In just the first half of 2024, 26,587 scam cases were reported, with losses exceeding $385.6 million. Behind some of these numbers are residents of Aljunied GRC, a number of whom have sought my help to recover their hard-earned money. Sadly, in most cases I’ve seen, recovery has been minimal, as the funds have been transferred out of Singapore and the burden of preventing scams still rests heavily on the shoulders of end users.

The Protection from Scams Bill is an important step towards combating this scourge. However, it introduces a significant change to the legal relationship between banks and their customers. Traditionally, banks have acted as fiduciaries, with a singular duty of loyalty to their customers, including following specific instructions for financial transactions. This Bill, however, empowers the police to issue Restriction Orders to banks, enabling them to temporarily restrict an individual’s banking transactions if there is reasonable belief that the customer is about to transfer money to a scammer.

I believe that this is a justifiable shift given the grave risks posed by scams, including the potential for victims to lose their life savings. However, its effectiveness is contingent upon timely identification and intervention by the authorities, which may not be feasible in all cases. Many scams are executed within minutes — even seconds — leaving no time for third parties to intervene. This makes the Bill less effective in these increasingly common high-speed scenarios.

May I ask the Minister of State, based on the scam cases that came to the attention of the police over the past year, has the Ministry modelled how many Restriction Orders would have been issued if this Bill had already been in effect?

To better combat scams, we need more systemic safeguards that stop scams before they start, hold financial institutions (FIs), telcos, social media companies and messaging providers more accountable in preventing scams from taking place on their platforms, and compensate victims if they fail to put in place adequate measures.

Shared Responsibility Framework

Some safeguards are captured in the Shared Responsibility Framework (SRF), which took effect on 16 December 2024. However, the SRF focuses solely on phishing scams that lead to unauthorised transactions. It assigns a few specific duties to banks and telcos to mitigate such scams, and requires compensation for victims when these duties are not fulfilled.

While the SRF improves protections against phishing-related threats, it does not cover the full range of scams affecting consumers today. Many scams, such as investment scams or romance scams, rely on social engineering to deceive victims into authorising payments under false pretences. Unlike phishing scams, these involve victims being misled about the purpose of the transaction rather than unauthorised access. Addressing such scams requires tailored strategies and frameworks, which I will come back to later.

Conflict of Interest in Investigations

I am concerned about the SRF’s reliance on banks to conduct the initial investigation into scams, including assessing whether they have fulfilled their duties. This presents an inherent conflict of interest, as banks are both the investigator and an interested party, with a financial incentive to conclude that they met their obligations. This also creates a significant disadvantage for scam victims, who lack access to key evidence, such as system logs or fraud detection records, and often do not have the expertise to effectively challenge the banks’ findings.

Scenario Highlighting the Problem

Consider this scenario: A bank customer falls victim to a phishing scam where their funds are fraudulently transferred out of their account. The customer raises a claim under the SRF, asserting that the bank failed to meet its obligations, such as sending real-time notifications or flagging the suspicious transaction through its fraud detection systems. The bank conducts the initial investigation and concludes that it fulfilled all its duties under the SRF, including providing the required alerts and adhering to the cooling-off period. It informs the customer of its findings and denies liability for the losses.

The customer, lacking access to system logs or detailed evidence of the bank’s actions, is unable to independently verify whether these obligations were indeed fulfilled.

FIDReC and MAS’ Access to Evidence

Although the customer has the option to escalate the matter to FIDReC or MAS, these bodies may also face limitations in their ability to access critical evidence. If these bodies are called upon to adjudicate disputes or review banks’ investigations under the SRF, do they have direct access to the necessary evidence, such as system logs, fraud detection records, and notification timestamps? If these bodies rely solely on banks to supply this evidence, there is a risk that the information provided may be selective or incomplete, especially when the findings could impact the banks’ liability.

For oversight to be truly effective, these adjudicating bodies must have the authority and technical capability to directly access and verify evidence rather than depend on the banks’ representations. Without this, the impartiality and robustness of the review process may be compromised.

Proposal for Independent Investigative Body

To address these shortcomings, an independent investigative body should be established to handle scam-related cases pertaining to banks’ fulfilment of their SRF obligations. This body would examine evidence provided by the bank, the customer and any relevant third parties to ensure impartiality and transparency. Such a body would act as a neutral arbiter, removing the inherent conflict of interest in having banks investigate cases where they are an interested party.

Additionally, victims should be informed of their rights and available recourse options as part of the investigation outcome report. This includes clear guidance on how to escalate disputes to independent bodies such as FIDReC. Providing this information upfront will ensure victims are aware of their options and are not left without avenues for redress if they disagree with the findings of the investigation.

Enhanced Protections Against a Wider Range of Scams

I would like to make several more proposals for regulators to require platforms to put in place enhanced protections against a wider range of scams. These complement the proposals I put forward in my speech during the Second Reading debate of the Online Criminal Harms Bill on 5 July 2023.

Digital Wallets

A recurring scam that my residents have brought to my attention involves the misuse of digital wallets like Apple Pay and Google Pay. Scammers set up a digital wallet linked to the victim’s bank account. While multi-factor authentication (MFA) is typically required during setup, scammers exploit social engineering techniques to manipulate victims into unknowingly approving the setup. Once the wallet is linked, subsequent payments often bypass additional authentication, allowing scammers to rapidly deplete funds without further victim involvement.

This highlights several possible vulnerabilities in the current system. First, the reliance on MFA alone is insufficient when victims are tricked into authorising fraudulent setups. Second, once the digital wallet is authorised, there is a lack of effective monitoring to detect and flag suspicious transactions. Third, the absence of clear accountability between banks and digital wallet providers exacerbates the issue, leaving victims with little recourse.

To address this gap, banks must be required to work with digital wallet providers to deploy real-time fraud detection algorithms that monitor all digital wallet transactions for anomalies, including transactions that occur, after the initial digital wallet setup. These algorithms should integrate behavioural analysis, such as device changes, unusual transaction patterns or foreign IP addresses, to flag high-risk activities. This will enable proactive intervention to block unauthorised activities before funds are lost. Banks should be held liable for losses if they fail to meet these duties.

Know Your Payee

Financial institutions should be required by the regulator to enhance backend fraud detection by integrating account data, behavioural analysis and anomaly detection to identify high-risk payees—who are the possible scammers or their agents. This approach minimises reliance on customers’ judgement alone and strengthens fraud detection.

Centralised Scam Database

Many platforms, including social media, email and messaging services, as well as telcos and mobile handsets, already offer mechanisms to block and report suspected scams. However, these reports are often siloed, remaining on the user’s device or with the platform concerned. There is no centralised scam database to consolidate and share this information.

Currently, many scam reports only enter the scam database managed by the Singapore Police Force if the user installs the ScamShield app and submits the scam through it. This approach is insufficient to crowdsource the collective knowledge of a broader pool of users to identify and report scams as they emerge.

To address this, the scam database currently managed by the police should be allowed to receive real-time updates from banks, telcos, social media platforms and messaging providers based on user reports, while incorporating robust safeguards to protect privacy. These platforms should then use this shared data for monitoring and proactively blocking scams on their platforms.

Rating Relevant Entities

MAS and IMDA should assess and rate financial institutions, telcos, social media companies and messaging platforms on the robustness of their anti-scam measures and their implementation of the systemic safeguards mentioned earlier.

To promote accountability and incentivise improvements, these ratings should be clear, fair and standardised, with transparency to consumers. However, vulnerabilities identified during the assessment should not be publicly disclosed until the entities have had a reasonable opportunity to address them to ensure security is not compromised.

Conclusion

Mr Speaker, scams are an evolving threat. This Bill takes an important step forward with its focus on “emergency brakes” to mitigate harm in individual cases. However, its scope remains narrow. To effectively combat scams, we need more systemic safeguards that address root causes and build resilience across platforms.

These systemic safeguards include deploying real-time fraud detection for digital wallet transactions, enhancing Know Your Payee mechanisms to flag suspicious payees, and creating a centralised scam database accessible to banks, telcos and social media companies for real-time monitoring and blocking. Together, these measures will ensure more robust prevention, swift enforcement and shared responsibility in protecting Singaporeans from scams.

Sir, I support this Bill but urge the government to consider these proposals, and look forward to the Minister of State’s responses to them.

Data privacy, rental housing & NS

On 7 Jan 2025, I will be asking parliamentary questions to address issues concerning data privacy, housing affordability and balancing national service obligations with work responsibilities.

First, I will be raising questions to the Minister for Digital Development and Information about the use of NRIC numbers and their associated privacy risks. I want to understand whether directives had been issued previously to stop organisations from using NRIC numbers for authentication or as default passwords, and how compliance with these directives had been enforced.

I will also ask the Minister for Home Affairs if MHA has assessed the risks of the current NRIC number structure and whether there are plans to exclude identifiable information, like the year of birth. Additionally, I will ask about the feasibility of creating a separate unique identifier for Singapore residents that can be updated in the event of data breaches.

Second, I will be addressing concerns related to public rental housing with the Minister for National Development. My questions will focus on tenants who have experienced rent increases due to an increase in their income, and whether these increases might discourage efforts towards improving their financial situation. I will also ask if the rent adjustment model can be refined to better support tenants in their journey towards financial independence.

Third, I will be highlighting challenges faced by NSmen during In-Camp Training (ICT) in my questions to the Minister for Defence. I will ask if dedicated workspaces can be created in camps to allow NSmen to manage urgent work matters without disrupting their training. Additionally, I will explore measures to prevent employers from interfering with NSmen’s ICT obligations and whether current policies adequately ensure that NS obligations do not place Singaporean men at a career disadvantage compared to women and foreign employees.

(Image: Generated by AI)

MediShield Life Scheme (Amendment) Bill

The MediShield Life Scheme (Amendment) Bill 2024 introduces several changes to the MediShield Life framework to adjust premium structures, enhance administrative powers and improve the affordability of healthcare coverage. I would like to seek clarification on several areas that may impact Singaporeans financially and administratively.

Ministerial Powers for Regulation and Subsidy Criteria

Clause 11 amends Section 34 of the Act, which grants the Minister broad powers to make regulations, including determining premium rates for different classes of insured persons. MediShield Life premium subsidies now consider both Per Capita Household Income (PCHI) and the Annual Value (AV) of one’s residence. The AV tiers provide the highest subsidy to lower income insured persons living in properties with AVs up to $21,000 and a reduced subsidy for AVs between $21,000 and $25,000, while AVs above $25,000 receive no subsidy, unless they are from the Pioneer or Merdeka Generation.

This criterion could present a financial challenge for some low or no-income households, particularly retirees living in private property and are born in 1960 or later. These individuals may face rising medical bills yet do not qualify for premium subsidies due to the property they live in. Many of these elderly Singaporeans are unlikely to downsize their homes, especially if they are currently suffering from serious illnesses. The physical and emotional disruption of relocating during a vulnerable period is impractical and could worsen their health conditions.

For retirees and other low-income households, I urge the government to consider removing AV as a means-testing criterion. Minimally those with AVs above $25,000 should still be allowed to apply for premium subsidies, and a holistic and transparent assessment should be made based on their individual circumstances. This approach would allow the scheme to target subsidies more effectively towards those who genuinely lack cash flow for their healthcare needs.

Premium Adjustments and Transparency

Clause 5 grants the Minister flexibility to set premium rates through prescribed means, possibly via online publications. Although this change could streamline the process, I have some concerns about stability and predictability of premium rates. Policyholders, especially those with lower incomes, rely on consistent healthcare costs to plan their finances. Frequent premium adjustments could challenge their ability to budget effectively. 

Will the government establish a regular schedule for premium adjustments, and if not, how much advance notice will policyholders receive to prepare for changes? This will provide policyholders with more transparency and predictability regarding their healthcare expenses.

Approval of Claimable Medical Services

Clause 4 grants the Minister discretion to approve medical institutions and the treatments they offer as eligible for MediShield Life claims. Although this change may help manage costs, it could also limit access to necessary care if certain treatments or institutions do not receive approval. Unapproved services might force policyholders to pay out-of-pocket, discouraging them from seeking essential treatment.

Could the Minister clarify if the criteria for approving medical services and a complete list of approved services and institutions will be published regularly? This will help policyholders to make informed healthcare choices and avoid unexpected costs.

Additionally, does this amendment allow the Minister to designate Traditional Chinese Medicine (TCM) and other traditional medical practices as approved medical treatments in the future? Many Singaporeans rely on TCM and other traditional practices for managing chronic conditions and maintaining overall health.

Enhanced Penalties for False Information

Clause 6 broadens the scope of offences related to false or misleading information in health declarations, means declarations or claims. This amendment aims to deter fraud, but it may disproportionately impact elderly or less tech-savvy policyholders who may make honest mistakes in their submissions. 

What are the provisions for rectifying minor or first-time errors, especially for vulnerable groups? Establishing a grace period or correction mechanism would prevent harsh penalties for honest mistakes, particularly for seniors unfamiliar with digital processes.

Use of Means Information for Recovery Actions

Clause 9 allows the government to use means information to assess eligibility and support recovery actions for outstanding premiums. Although this approach may ensure targeted resource allocation, it could place additional pressure on low-income policyholders. Aggressive recovery actions, if based primarily on financial data, could create financial stress for households already struggling to meet healthcare costs. 

Will the government provide safeguards like automatic premium loans or deferred payment options to protect financially vulnerable policyholders and help them maintain coverage without incurring penalties?

Will policyholders lose coverage if they still fail to pay their premiums?

Service of Documents and Demand Notices

Clause 10 introduces electronic methods for serving official documents, including email, which may improve efficiency. However, policyholders who are less comfortable with digital platforms might miss important updates, potentially leading to unintended coverage lapses or penalties. 

Does the government offer additional communication methods, such as phone calls or in-person notifications, to ensure all policyholders receive and understand crucial information?

Conclusion

Mr Speaker, this Bill seeks to enhance the MediShield Life framework, but these changes must not place unnecessary burdens on those who rely on the scheme most. For low-income households, I urge MOH to review the use of AV as a criterion for means testing, so that retirees and those with limited cash flow can receive subsidies based on their actual financial need.

Transparency in Political Advertising

In Parliament on 7 Aug 2024, I asked the Prime Minister whether political parties or candidates who pay digital content creators to post during or before election campaigns are required to disclose these payments. I also inquired whether content creators must declare their partnerships with political parties in their posts, and what the specific disclosure requirements are.

In his response on behalf of the PM, Minister Chan Chun Sing said that any paid Online Election Advertising (OEA) must be disclosed, showing the names of those who paid for and approved the content. Payments to content creators during non-election periods, if related to an upcoming election, must also be declared.

The Minister also mentioned rules under the Foreign Interference (Countermeasures) Act and other existing requirements for political parties.

Transparency is key to maintaining trust in our electoral process.

This is the full text of the question and answer:

7 August 2024

Written Reply to Parliamentary Question on Whether Political Parties or Candidates that Pay Digital Content Creators to Post Content Either Before or During Election Campaigns Will Be Required to Disclose These Payments

Mr. Gerald Giam Yean Song asked the Prime Minister and Minister of Finance (a) whether political parties or candidates that pay digital content creators, either directly or indirectly, to post content either before or during election campaigns will be required to disclose these payments; (b) whether the said content creators are also required to declare the nature of their partnership with political parties or candidates within their posts; and (c) what are the disclosure requirements.

Written Reply by Mr. Chan Chun Sing, Minister of Education, for the Prime Minister:

1. Under the legislation governing Online Election Advertising (OEA), only political parties, candidates, their election agents, or other third parties who have received written authorisation are allowed to publish OEA that is paid for. Every payment made in respect of any expenses incurred in the conduct or management of an election must be submitted as part of the declarations by the candidates and their election agents, rather than the digital content creator, and supported with bills and receipts as set out in the relevant laws. This includes all paid OEA. The OEA must disclose that it is paid for, and show the full names of the persons who paid for it. The full names of the persons who approved the content of the OEA must be shown as well.

2. Election expenses include any expenses incurred whether before, during, or after the election, in respect of the conduct or management of the election. Thus, any payments made to content creators during the non-election period ahead of any impending election would have to be declared as long as the content created is in respect of the conduct or management of the candidate’s election. Outside of elections, there are also rules governing the receipt of donations received by all political parties, political office holders, and other politically significant persons. Such donations must be disclosed under the Foreign Interference (Countermeasures) Act. There are also other accounting and disclosure requirements on political parties as well, as the Member will be aware.

Bridging the Gap Between Education and Workforce Needs

In the parliamentary session in May 2024, I asked Minister for Education Chan Chun Sing about how schools are aligning educational pathways with Singapore’s workforce needs. My questions were driven by a concern that educational and career guidance in our schools is not sufficiently tied to the actual demands of our nation’s economy.

I asked if the Ministry of Education (MOE) would:

1. Develop resources that map the Ministry of Manpower’s (MOM) Shortage Occupation List (SOL) to relevant educational pathways;

2. Provide targeted counselling to students and their parents that connects identified skill shortages with appropriate courses of study;

3. Organise systematic industry outreach to schools that focuses on in-demand jobs and the qualifications they require; and

4. Ensure that such career information is accessible to less-privileged families, ensuring equity in educational and career opportunities.

These measures are intended to make career guidance more proactive, precise and inclusive, equipping students and their families with the tools needed for informed decision-making.

In response, the Minister highlighted the existing efforts, including industry immersion programmes, learning journeys, career talks and the MyCareersFuture portal. He noted the importance of guiding students towards in-demand careers but also emphasized the need to respect students’ personal preferences in choosing their educational paths.

While I appreciate the existing resources mentioned by the Minister, I believe there is a need for a more direct and structured approach. There is a potential disconnect between the skills shortages identified by MOM and the career guidance provided to students. My proposals aimed to bridge this gap more effectively and ensure that all students, regardless of their background, have access to the information necessary to navigate their future careers successfully.

While respecting individual choice is paramount, it does not preclude providing students comprehensive, relevant and actionable information to enable them to align their personal ambitions with broader economic opportunities.

By integrating real-time labour data into our educational planning and guidance to students, we can optimise both educational investments and labour market outcomes, and better prepare our youth for the dynamic demands of the future workforce.

This was my full question and the Minister’s answer on 8 May 2024:

STUDENT- AND PARENT-FRIENDLY CAREER RESOURCES AND COUNSELLING THAT MAP SHORTAGE OCCUPATION LIST TO EDUCATION PATHWAYS 

Mr Gerald Giam Yean Song asked the Minister for Education whether the Ministry will (i) work with the Ministry of Manpower (MOM) to develop student and parent-friendly career resources which map MOM’s Shortage Occupation List to the relevant education pathways (ii) provide counselling to link skills shortages to suitable courses of study (iii) organise industry outreaches to schools to highlight in-demand jobs and the required qualifications and (iv) ensure that such career information is accessible to less-privileged families. 

Mr Chan Chun Sing: Schools and Institutes of Higher Learning (IHLs) prepare students for a wide range of careers across all sectors. Students, including those from less privileged families, have opportunities to attend industry immersion programmes, learning journeys and career talks, to learn more about the different career pathways available. Information on career opportunities in the various sectors is also available on the MyCareersFuture portal. 

Whilst we have an interest to steer more students towards courses that prepare them for in-demand careers such as those in MOM’s Shortage Occupation List, we need to understand and respect that students have their personal considerations and preferences in choosing their course of study.

Source: Singapore Parliament Hansard

Cybersecurity (Amendment) Bill

My speech during the Second Reading debate on this Bill on 7 May 2024.


The Cybersecurity (Amendment) Bill seeks to extend the regulatory reach of the Cyber Security Agency of Singapore (CSA) by updating the existing Cybersecurity Act of 2018. This includes the broadening of oversight across newly classified critical information infrastructure (CII) and the introduction of stringent compliance and reporting requirements, all aimed at addressing the escalating challenges within our digital environment. 

In this age of digitalisation, cyberattacks on critical infrastructure can pose a significant threat to our national security and well-being. Examples of cyber attacks around the world abound.

Cyber attacks worldwide

In December 2015, Ukraine experienced a significant cyberattack targeting its power grid, which resulted in widespread electricity outages across several regions. This was one of the first known successful cyberattacks on a power grid. The attackers, who were sophisticated and well-coordinated, used phishing schemes to install malware on the networks of several regional electricity companies. They were able to gain control of the company’s systems and shut down substations, cutting off power for approximately 230,000 people for several hours. This incident not only disrupted everyday life but also exposed the vulnerability of essential infrastructure to cyber threats and the potential for state-sponsored cyber warfare.

In May 2017, the UK’s National Health Service (NHS) was struck by the WannaCry ransomware, a global cyberattack that infected over 200,000 computers across 150 countries. The NHS faced significant disruption as the ransomware encrypted data on infected machines, demanding payment to restore access. Approximately 19,000 appointments and operations were cancelled, and patients had to be diverted from emergency rooms which were unable to access critical digital services. The attack highlighted the importance of cybersecurity hygiene, as it exploited a known vulnerability in older Windows operating systems that had not been updated with available patches.

Here at home, in 2018, hackers infiltrated SingHealth’s healthcare system, stealing personal data of 1.5 million patients. This included information like names, addresses, and dates of birth. Additionally, medical records of 160,000 patients, including that of the Prime Minister, were also compromised. The sophistication of the attack, the type of data targeted and the resources needed for such a breach suggested that this cyberattack may have been state-sponsored. 

Each of these incidents serve as stark reminders of the chaos and danger posed by cyberattacks. They underline the need for robust cybersecurity measures and the ability to rapidly respond to and manage cybersecurity threats, particularly when critical national infrastructure is at risk.

Operational intervention by CSA

Under this Bill, the CSA is empowered to regulate, monitor and enforce compliance through penalties and directives. I would like to ask the Minister if the Bill grants the CSA, or any other national body, explicit authority to take over the operations of critical systems if their owners fail to secure them adequately, despite directions from the Authority. The current provision in Section 23 allows the Minister to direct organisations to take measures to counter serious and imminent threats but does not explicitly grant the authority to directly take over operations of critical information infrastructure. This explicit authority may be necessary in situations where immediate action must be taken to prevent or mitigate a cybersecurity threat that poses a critical security risk.

In contrast, the Bus Services Industry Act 2015 is more explicit in its wording about operational intervention. Section 30 of that Act grants the Land Transport Authority (LTA) the power to make a “step-in order” in certain circumstances. This order allows the LTA to take over the operations of a licensed bus operator or appoint a step-in operator to do so.

The Bus Service Industry Act also specifies the powers and functions of the step-in operator, such as having the same powers as the original licensee and requiring the licensee to provide access to premises, assets and employees. The Cybersecurity Act is less specific about what the emergency “measures and requirements” may entail.

Incorporating similar provisions in the Cybersecurity Act could provide a clearer legal framework for the CSA to directly intervene and take control of critical information infrastructure when necessary to protect national security or the lives of Singaporeans. This would ensure that the government has the necessary tools to respond swiftly and decisively to imminent cybersecurity threats.

In addition, while the CSA’s regulatory and enforcement roles are crucial, in instances where national security is at imminent risk, are there any additional protocols for bringing in the SAF’s Digital and Intelligence Service (DIS) to manage the cybersecurity defences of critical information infrastructure?

Does the Minister see it necessary to develop a framework that enables either the CSA or the DIS to respond rapidly and directly to imminent threats to our critical information infrastructure, ensuring that operational control can be swiftly transferred in a crisis? Having this operational backstop is desirable precisely because cybersecurity attacks have high potential severity and could unfold very quickly.

This will require the strengthening of public-private collaboration to ensure the seamless integration of state and commercial resources in fortifying our national cybersecurity infrastructure. In addition, the CSA will need to ensure it has the necessary expertise to undertake such responsibilities when called upon to do so. The agency needs to be adequately staffed and equipped with the requisite skills and technology in order to effectively manage and mitigate cybersecurity threats. Such an arrangement will be a long-run investment in our own capabilities that is worth making, both in defensive terms but also to enable public-private knowledge diffusion.

Extraterritoriality

Regarding the new sections 7(1A) and 16A(1), how will the government enforce its extraterritorial judgments on overseas providers of critical information infrastructure if the owner is not in Singapore? Can the Commissioner take enforcement action outside of Singapore? If we aren’t able to enforce the laws overseas, what purpose do these extraterritorial provisions serve?

Monitoring

In section 29A on monitoring, relying primarily on examining historical records and conducting ad-hoc inspections may not be sufficient to provide the real-time, continuous monitoring needed to keep pace with rapidly evolving cyber threats. More proactive oversight measures, potentially including direct access to providers’ systems, may be required for effective supervision. WannaCry, the global ransomware attack in 2017, rapidly spread across computer systems over seven hours, while the 2015 Ukraine power grid hack led to electricity outages lasting up to six hours. These are events that unfolded in less than one day. If we really want to monitor with a deterrent view in mind, we need to have operational integration and develop our backstop capabilities.

Conclusion

In conclusion, Mr Speaker, while the Cybersecurity (Amendment) Bill makes important strides towards enhancing our national cybersecurity posture, our approach must remain adaptable to the realities of digital warfare and capable of decisive action in times of emergencies. 

Sir, I support the Bill but I look forward to the Minister’s responses to my concerns.